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ABSTRACT
The Megaton Mission: The Role of the Nuclear Arms Race in
1950s British Imperialism
by
HOLDING Joseph David Daniel
Master of Philosophy

In August 1945, the Pacific theatre of the Second World War came to a
dramatic close with the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Following this, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union
grew tremendously and the two superpowers set about developing even more
destructive bombs in case these tensions reached a breaking point. The nuclear bomb
came to symbolise power in the post-war era. However, they were not the only powers
with nuclear programmes in the 1950s. Churchill, and successive Conservative
governments, were keen in joining the nuclear arms race. Operation Grapple was
conducted secretly from 1954-58 on Christmas Island, then part of the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands in the Southern Pacific.
The Gilbert and Ellice Islands were a Crown Colony at the time, and this paper
shall examine the connection between the nuclear experiments and the British Empire,
and geopolitical power by extension. This thesis is divided into three thematic chapters.
The first chapter explores how space and place shaped aspirations for power and vice
versa. Not only did Operation Grapple bring about colossal environmental damage but
major demographic changes with both the arrival of the British and Fijian military
personnel as well as a new transient population who brought the resources necessary
to sustain such a population. As well as the functions of the different islands being
altered, they came to symbolise the long-term health issues which affected the Fijian
veterans long after the experiments were over.

The second chapter examines how colonial rule in the Gilbert and Ellice islands
was shaped by the nuclear experiments. It explores the rapid change in infrastructure
needed to accommodate the new population and the friction it caused when the issue
of financial responsibility was raised. This chapter also explores how colonial rule
became increasingly reliant on the military and how the developing military complex
at Britain extended to remote colonies. Finally, the limits of ‘East of Suez’ and various
governmental departments’ visions for the future are discussed as the South Pacific
was useful for further developments of nuclear weaponry.
The third and final chapter gauges Britain’s place in the world through their
relationships with other nations. This is achieved by examining how Britain interacted
with the United States, France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji. It concludes
that Britain was in a weaker position to negotiate with other nations but were still able
to wield some power in a softer way, despite their label as a ‘superpower’ being called
into question.
This thesis shall reach the overall conclusion that the experiments elevated the
status of the islands in the minds of the British government to one of high importance
as well as offering the British the means of maintaining geopolitical relevance as well
as recalibrating attention to the South Pacific, albeit briefly.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and
I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been
duly acknowledged.

(HOLDING Joseph David Daniel)
Date: X V - °\-

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………….. ii
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………… 1
CHAPTER I ……………………………………………….………………………. 12
CHAPTER II …..……………………………………………………………...…… 38
CHAPTER III …….………………………………………………………..……… 63
CONCLUSIONS …………………………………………………………..……… 89
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………..………………… 94

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank so many people for their help whilst completing this
project. Thank you to my supervisor Prof. Mark Hampton for his continuous feedback
and expertise steered me in the right direction throughout this process. I would also
like to thank the rest of the staff at the history department for their guidance and interest
in this thesis.
I am also grateful for the support of my friends, especially the ones I made at
Every Nation: Hong Kong, in particular Akin, Mike and Hong who helped me settle
into a new country and kept me going when things were tough. My family back in the
UK supported me from afar, especially my grandparents whose faith in me was always
a continuous source of encouragement.

ii

Introduction
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Overview
The Second World War ended with a bang. Although the European theatre of
the war had ended in May, the Pacific theatre carried on until August, primarily
between Japan and the United States. A large part of the American war effort was
achieved through the Manhattan Project, which launched in 1942 with the aim of
producing weapons of mass destruction which had not yet been seen. 1 With Japan
showing no signs of surrender, President Truman decided to unleash two atomic
bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which led to Japanese surrender and
the end to the war. Yet, it was not only a new era of peace that the end of the war
ushered in, but a new potential for warfare. Despite being on the same sides of the war,
tensions soon rose between the capitalist west and the communist east, which set the
tone for the remainder of the 20th century. The Soviet Union started their nuclear
experiments in 1943 and had their first functioning bomb in August 1949. 2 This shook
American confidence as they no longer had a monopoly on atomic weaponry. The
nuclear bomb came to represent power in the aftermath of the Second World War, due
to its ability to cause such damage in the event of another large-scale war breaking out.
The size of the arsenal, and the sophistication of the technology furthered this in the
nuclear arms race.
However, the nuclear arms race was far from a two-horse race. Churchill was
keen on Britain having its own nuclear arsenal. One of his main reasons for this was
Britain maintaining a strong geopolitical position. 3 Although British scientists were
involved in the Manhattan Project, Truman became paranoid about American nuclear
secrets being too widely shared so passed the Atomic Energy Act 1946, more
commonly known as the McMahon Act, which prevented international input to the
development of such weaponry. 4 This left Britain in a vulnerable position as in 1946,
they did not have their own weaponry, but the idea was popular among the

J. A. Hughes, The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb, (London: Icon Books, 2003),
p.54
2
H. Heller, The Cold War and New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945-2005, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2006), p.71
3
G. Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb: How the United States Overtook Britain in the First Nuclear Arms
Race, (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), p.242
4
S. J. Ball, 'Military Nuclear Relations Between the United States and Great Britain Under the Terms
of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958', The Historical Journal, Vol.38, No. 2, (1995), p.441
1
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Conservative Party, who were out of office when the Act was passed. When returning
to power in 1951, Churchill soon got to work on developing the British nuclear arsenal.
Originally, the experiments took place in Maralinga, in South Australia, and
had a limited success. These initial rounds of experiments may have led to Britain
having their own nuclear bomb in 1952 but only produced a small yield from fission
bombs, which were rapidly becoming outdated compared to weapons belonging to the
leading superpowers. 5 However, with the changes of Conservative leadership in the
mid-1950s, developing the nuclear bomb further was less of a priority but never
completely out of mind of the British government. With the technology being out of
date, the goal of the next round of experiments was a controllable weapon with a yield
in the megaton range. Backward technology was a hindrance for the British
government as it left them vulnerable to Soviet attack if the Cold War heated up, as
Britain may have been the first European nation to be taken out if they had weapons
of mass destruction. 6
Plans for a further series, known as Operation Grapple, began in 1954 with the
intention of developing a bomb with a yield in the megaton range. The experiments
moved from Maralinga to the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony, in the central Pacific,
as the nuclear experiments were increasingly unpopular with the Australian public.7
The series compromised of four rounds, the first was rather disappointing and only
brought a maximum 0.72 megaton yield in June 1957. 8 The next round, Grapple X,
was the first to use nuclear fission but was rather too big at 1.8 megatons. 9 The
penultimate experiment, Grapple Y, was an even bigger explosion, and the highest the
British tested to date, at 2.8 megatons. 10 This reflected a breakthrough and success for
the British scientists but the explosion was too big to control, and the final experiment,
Grapple Z brought a manageable 1 megaton yield in September 1958. 11 Ultimately,
Operation Grapple was a success. Britain was the first European power in NATO to

L. Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p.66
M. J. Turner, British Power and International Relations During the 1950s: A Tenable Position?,
(London: Lexington Books, 2009), p.82
7
N. MacLellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s Pacific H-Bomb Tests, (Canberra: Australian
National Press: 2017), p.35
8
Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (2001), p.150
9
Ibid, p.161
10
Ibid, p.167
11
Ibid, p.191
5
6
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possess nuclear weaponry at the beginning of the 1950s. By the end of the decade, the
technology was successfully updated meaning that Britain had evened out their
position in the nuclear arms race and managed to maintain geopolitical relevance by
developing what had become a symbol of power.
However, it is not only the nuclear bomb that Britain relied on for prestige on
the global stage. By the 1950s, the British Empire was a long-established institution.
Throughout the 19th century, Britain had colonised a large amount of the world, which
gave the European power a lot of clout when it came to international relations and
provided an important pillar in maintaining British strength in the world. This
sustained into the 20th century, and even survived the world wars. However, this was
changing as the loss of the Raj in 1947 and subsequent decolonisation movements in
Africa suggested that the structure of Empire that Britain had relied on was no longer
stable by the late 1950s. As well as being strategic in the Cold War, the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands were part of this older colonial structure. The islands became a Crown
Colony in 1882, primarily due to a growing German presence in the Pacific and proof
of a viable copra trade. 12 The metropole rarely paid much attention to the islands as
they were primary seen as a colonial backwater until the Grapple Task Force arrived.
They were annexed by the Japanese in 1942 and liberated by the American military
during the ‘island hopping’ campaign in the final stages of the war. 13 Although the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands were far from an integral part of the Empire, they found a
new role during the Cold War as the setting for the British government to develop its
own nuclear bomb. This dissertation will focus on how Operation Grapple affected the
British Empire, and British geopolitical power, in the late 1950s. This is an important
issue to discuss as the link between nuclear weaponry and geopolitical status is still an
issue being discussed today. The North Korea, Iranian, and Chinese nuclear arsenals
are still high-profile issues discussed within the context of how powerful each nation
is. The renewal of Trident often leads to questions of what Britain’s role in the world
is in the 21st century as well as the ethics of possessing such powerful weapons.
Examining Operation Grapple is vital as it offers a parallel to the discussions
governments around the world are having today. This project offers a window into
B. MacDonald, Cinderellas of Empire: Towards a History of Kiribati and Tuvalu, (Canberra: ANU
Press, 1982), p.87
13
Ibid, pp.147-151
12
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how the British government used nuclear weaponry in the 1950s as a means of
maintaining their status as a ‘great power’, which will shed light on the predicament
the same government is in today.

Literature Review
The discussion of the link between Operation Grapple and the state of British
imperialism, and geopolitical power, sits at the intersection of various
historiographical categories. Primarily, this dissertation is part of the broader trend of
Pacific history. Compared to other branches of scholarship, Pacific history is relatively
new. Following the independence movements in the Pacific in the 1970s, academic
attention turned to the region and the first wave of Pacific history began. Many of the
works in the 1980s were responding to the recent independence movements and
offered a contextualisation of them. 14 This meant that they tended to focus on the
colonial eras. Discussions of the nuclear experiments that took place there were
mentioned in general terms as they were an important part in the reason behind
independence movements but due to the confidentiality surrounding the archival
sources discussion was limited. Now that the archival sources are available, this piece
of research will expand on the discussions of the first wave of Pacific historiography
by offering a more in-depth analysis of the later part of the colonial era of the Pacific.
This initial interest in the Pacific came to a head in the mid-1990s when more
edited collections were published but focused more on the peoples of the Pacific and
were able to discuss the nuclear testing in more detail as many of the restrictions were
lifted. 15 However, the British experiments were side-lined in favour of discussing the
American and French tests as they had a more profound impact in the Pacific and lasted
for a longer period of time. Interest in the Pacific dwindled until the 2010s, which has
seen a renewed interest from historians that persists to the present. Recent scholarship
has shifted from broader overviews of the Pacific toward more concrete areas of

Key examples include: MacDonald, Cinderellas of Empire, (1982), J. Smith, Clouds of Deceit,
(London: Bloomsbury, 1985), R. Thakur (ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects,
(London: Macmillan, 1991)
15
Key examples include: H. Hiery and J. Mackenzie (eds.), European Impact and Pacific Influence,
(London: Taurus, 1997) D. Denoon, S. Firth, J. Linnekin, M. Meleisa and K. Nero (eds.), The
Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997)
14
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discussion, such as environmental issues, the effects of nuclear technology, and the
impacts of colonisation and decolonisation movements. 16 This piece of research shall
incorporate such themes into discussions surrounding the nuclear age of the Pacific by
looking at environmental and political impacts of Operation Grapple. In 2017,
Maclellan’s Grappling with the Bomb was published and offered a thorough
examination of Operation Grapple. It primarily focused on the reasons behind the
experiments and the effects it had on those involved, as well as contextualising the
legal battle launched by the Fijian veterans against the British government. Although
Maclellan acknowledges the colonial context of the experiments, he does not go far
enough in exploring the link between Operation Grapple and the state of the British
Empire, instead he favours explaining Britain’s place in the Cold War. This
dissertation hopes to further Maclellan’s argument by setting the experiments in an
imperial context, rather than completely as part of the Cold War. Moreover, recent
Pacific historians have broadened their scope of primary sources. The use of oral
testimony, which has long been important in various cultures across the Pacific islands,
has been incorporated. This thesis shall combine archival and testimonial sources to
offer a much more rounded narrative of the British nuclear experiments.
However, Pacific history is not the only field that this dissertation fits into. The
historiography of the British Empire is a much more expansive field than Pacific
history, though there is much overlap between the two. An imperial perspective on
Operation Grapple is one that looks at how the nuclear experiments fit within large
narratives of the British Empire and geopolitical power. When it comes to
conceptualising the British Empire in the post-war era, there have been many
theoretical frameworks proposed. The Second World War has largely been agreed to
be a turning point for the Empire, as it severely weakened the British state with its
financial toll. For Samson, The Suez Crisis of 1956 was another turning point as it
exposed British weakness and that decolonisation movements became inevitable. 17 An
examination of Operation Grapple demonstrates that this is a rather too simplistic way
of approaching the issue of British imperial decline. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Key examples include: M.K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of the Seas, Peoples, and Cultures,
(Cambridge: CUP, 2012), W.D. McIntyre, Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands, (Oxford:
OUP, 2014), T. Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the
Ends of Empire, (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb, (2017)
17
J. Samson, The British Empire, (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p.197
16
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were small, remote and did not have the natural resources needed to sustain its
population. They would not have been seen as a viable option for independence,
compared to Nigeria for example. The nuclear experiments were spurred on by the
Suez Crisis and managed to sustain Britain’s presence in a small and remote colony
for some time afterwards by giving them a new purpose as they were not a viable
option for decolonisation.
This dissertation will challenge any notions of ‘inevitable decline’ in the postwar era and will extend Darwin’s view to the smallest colonies in the Pacific. To
Darwin, it was better to view the empire as a series of interconnected relationships
which were constantly being renegotiated, which accounts for the longevity of British
imperialism. 18 In his seminal work The Empire Project, Darwin uses a myriad of case
studies from across the globe to demonstrate this to explain the rise and fall of the
British Empire. Although it would be unfair to criticise Darwin for excluding a rather
short-lived series of scientific experiments in a remote group of islands, his way of
approaching the issue of decolonisation and decline is perhaps the best way to
approach discussions of how Britain approached their Pacific colonies. Edgerton also
took a similar approach of ‘renegotiation’ in explaining the transformation of the
British state in the 20th century. He argued that the British state became more reliant
on the military to sustain their position on the global stage. 19 Edgerton focused on how
the British state itself became more militarised and offers little discussion on how this
extended to overseas territories. This thesis seeks to further his arguments by
examining how the furthest reaches of the Empire also became militarised. Operation
Grapple is a key example of this change in attitude affecting colonial administration
on the other side of the world. This dissertation will marry Darwin and Egerton’s
approaches to examine how Britain’s renegotiation of its relationships and move
toward a militarised state intersected. A parallel can be drawn with Daniel
Immerwahr’s recent work How to Hide and Empire, which examined how the United
States invested in military bases in various territories to maintain influences in those
regions as a form of informal colonisation. 20
J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970,
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009)
19
D. Edgerton, Warfare State Britain, 1920-1970, (Cambridge: CUP, 2006)
20
D. Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A Short History of the Greater United States, (London:
Penguin Random House, 2019)
18
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Pacific and Imperial history may be what underpins this piece of research but
there are plenty of others that it belongs to. Thoroughly examining what ‘imperialism’
meant in the post-war era has been a major part of the historiography of the Cold War.
However, this has primarily been used to discuss American, rather than British, foreign
policy. 21 The link between nuclear technology and imperialism has also been explored,
but primarily from an American and French perspective. This project will offer a
much-needed examination into where the British fit into these narratives. Moreover,
the history of science and technology has naturally explored the history of nuclear
weaponry. Arnold’s Britain and the H-Bomb is the only other monograph than
Maclellan’s to be dedicated to Operation Grapple and frames the experiments as an
example of British achievement and scientific breakthrough as the scientists in Britain
worked out how to build their own functioning hydrogen bombs independent of
American aid. 22 Although Arnold’s work provides an important insight into the
scientific side of the experiments, she primarily commented on the lives of the
scientists at the metropole rather than commenting on those in the Pacific. This
dissertation is less concerned with the science itself but will further Arnold’s research
by exploring the ramifications of the experiments, both globally and for those involved.
Methodology
To approach this issue, a variety of sources have been consulted. Primarily, the
files in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Department in the Colonial and Commonwealth
Office series, housed at the National Archives in London, will be of use. These concern
the planning of the Grapple series and include the minutes of planning meetings and
the correspondence between various governmental departments, and those on the
working in the Pacific. These principally took place between the Foreign Office,
Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Supply, but there is plenty form the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, as well as the Gilbertese and Fijian governors.
These will be especially useful as they will help shed light on the different perspectives
the different people in the British government had when it came to the megaton
mission. In turn, this will help to diversify discussions of how the metropole saw its

Heller, The Cold War and New Imperialism, (2006), J. Schofield and W. Cocroft (eds.), A Fearsome
Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold War, (London: Routledge, 2009)
22
Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (2001)
21
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place in the world and how they thought the Grapple series would affect it and what it
meant to each department individually. The inclusion of the governors in the Pacific
will also offer an insight into the changing role of the Pacific in the grander scheme of
the British world system and how the nuclear experiments altered their portfolio.
Ultimately, this shall provide an excellent grounding in exploring how the tests fit into
larger discussions of British power in the late 1950s.
The archival sources shall be supplemented with autobiographical and
testimonial sources. Vice Air-Marshall Oulton, who oversaw the experiments on
Christmas Island, published his account of Operation Grapple in 1987. 23 This will add
some diversity to the official archival sources by offering a glimpse into life on the
ground as well as the perspective of the higher-ranking officers beyond
correspondence. One of the pilots who flew the plane that dropped the bomb, Kenneth
Hubbard also wrote an autobiography, which was published in 1985, reflecting on his
time on the islands. 24 This will further the body of sources being used as it will allow
for the voices of lower-ranking officers to be included, and allow for discussions
surrounding what the role of the nuclear bomb in conjunction to British geopolitical
power actually meant to those who witnessed the blasts first-hand. Together these
autobiographies provide an insight into what the perception of the experiments as well
as an insight into what geopolitical power meant, which would have been limited with
relying on archival sources alone. Moreover, it is also important to consider the voices
of colonial subjects. Many Fijian soldiers were transported to the Gilbert and Ellice
Islands to provide the much-needed manpower, and subsequently made up the bulk of
lower-ranking military personnel. 25 Throughout the 1990s, journalist Nick Maclellan
conducted dozens of interviews with the veterans who served on Christmas Island.
This was primarily due to a legal battle launched against the British government due
to the adverse health effects many had in the decades following their return to Fiji.26
The inclusion of these sources, and discussions of Fiji’s role in the experiments, will

23
W. E. Oulton, Christmas Island Cracker: Account of the Planning and Execution of the British
Thermonuclear Bomb Tests, 1957, (London: Thomas Harmsworth, 1987)
24
K. Hubbard and M. Simmons, Operation Grapple: Testing Britain’s First H-Bomb, (Surrey: Ian Allen
ltd., 1985)
25
Tubanavau-Salaluba, L., Namoce, J.M. and Maclellan, N. (eds.), Kirisimasi: Na sotia kei na lewe ni
mataivalu e wai ni viti e na vakatovotovo iyaragi nei peritania mai Kirisimasi, (Pacific Concerns
Resource Centre, Suva: 1999)
26
Ibid, p.70
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allow for the discussion of Operation Grapple to be expanded and include an insight
into settler-indigenous relations, which were a key part of the changing nature of
geopolitical power in the post-war era. However, Maclellan’s work did not entirely
compromise of the testimonies of Fijian veterans, he also included two interviews with
the widows of veterans as well as an interview with one of the few Gilbertese women
who witnessed the experiments. Much of the indigenous population were removed
from the islands during the experiments, making such sources scarce. It is important
to include the sources from these women as they offer a reflection on the ramifications
of Britain’s determination to remain geopolitical relevant from sources which were
uncommon in scholarship until recently. Giving a historical agency to colonial subjects
from the Pacific is of the utmost importance as they were a key part of British
geopolitical power that was directly affected by Operation Grapple.
Project Overview
This dissertation shall be trisected into thematic chapters. The first chapter
explores how space and place shaped aspirations for power and in turn, how such
aspirations shaped such places. Not only was the environmental damage colossal, but
the function of the islands was transformed with an unprecedented population increase.
The function of Christmas and Malden Islands were transformed with the higherranking officers living at Malden, whilst the lower-ranking ones lived at Christmas,
where they all worked. In turn, the remote nature of the islands spurred the military
personnel on to succeed as many of them wanted to return home, whilst being the
embodiment of the health issues faced by the Fijians in the following decades. The
chapter concludes that although small and remote, the islands had as much an effect
on the experiments and the tests affected them.
The Second Chapter explores the theme of transformation in a different way.
It explores how colonial rule in the Gilbert and Ellice islands was shaped by Operation
Grapple. The colony saw a rapid change in infrastructure to accommodate the new
population. This chapter also explores how the military complex affected Britain
abroad and how colonial administration in the Gilbert and Ellice islands also became
reliant on the military. Finally, this chapter explores the limits of the ‘East of Suez’
movement, and how there were plans to remain in the Pacific as it was a useful region
10

in the development of a nuclear arsenal and there were no plans for Britain to leave
these smaller colonies as long as they could help it.
The third and final chapter will continue to broaden the scope of discussing the
nuclear experiments by gauging Britain’s place on the world stage. This shall be
achieved by examining how Britain interacted with the United States, France, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji, who are the nations frequently mentioned in
correspondence between different governmental departments. The chapter concludes
that Britain was in a weaker position to negotiate when it came to international
diplomacy but were able to wield power in different ways as part of their renegotiation
with other powers. Britain still managed to maintain a strong position globally, despite
their label as a ‘superpower’ being called into question.
Overall, Operation Grapple had a small but profound effect on the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands. Exploring this case study offers a window into how Britain became
increasingly militarised in the 20th century, and how this extended to the colonies as
well. The islands were not seen as viable candidates for decolonisation by the
metropolitan government and the militarisation of the Pacific islands meant that they
had a new purpose in the grander scheme of the British world system. Therefore, the
‘East of Suez’ movement did not extend to the small Pacific islands. Through the
development of an up to date nuclear arsenal, there was a new-found legitimacy.
Britain had a weapon of mass destruction, which was symbolic of power in the Cold
War, and one which meant that they had evened out their position in the nuclear arms
race and perhaps be hopeful of continuing this trend into the 1960s and beyond.
However, developing a nuclear arsenal had a profound impact on the islands, and
transformed them and both through increased infrastructure and the ways people
perceived them.

11
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Introduction
Operation Grapple had a profound impact on the Gilbert and Ellice Island
Colony. Many have written about their experiences on Christmas Island and reflected
on how the nuclear experiments shaped the islands and in turn, how the environment
shaped their experiences and the tests. One of the more obvious ways Operation
Grapple impacted the Gilbert Islands was it transformed it from a place to maintain a
nuclear deterrent and further national prestige of the metropole. The furthering of a
national agenda was reflected in the tests’ ability to further personal goals. Kenneth
Hubbard was one of the pilots that dropped the bombs who went to the island at a
young age with the intention of career advancement. This sentiment was shared by
Wilfrid Oulton, the Vice Air Marshall who was put in charge of overseeing the mission
on the ground. Like Hubbard, he saw Operation Grapple as a means of proving his
leadership abilities to those back in London. To them, the islands had a similar
symbolic meaning and provoked feelings of awe for Hubbard which were shared by
his Fijian counterparts. The main source of manpower for Operation Grapple came
from the Fijian military. In the 1990s, journalist Nic McLellan interviewed many Fijian
veterans about their experiences on Christmas Island. Many of which shared
Hubbard’s feelings of awe at witnessing the sheer power of a nuclear weapon being
detonated but the similarities end there. Many of the interviewees, including the
widows of the deceased veterans did not share the rather romantic view held by Oulton.
To many of them, the islands came to represent the problems they faced after the
bombs were dropped, such as chronic health issues, infertility, and premature death.
Although the British government has long denied that this was due to radiation
exposure, it has still affected how many Fijian perceive the islands and remember the
British Empire as a whole: negligent and secretive, as many felt they were left out of
the loop when it came to basic information about the experiments when they were
being conducted as well as the levels of radiation they were being exposed to.
Operation Grapple shaped the Gilbert and Ellice Islands by transforming their
perception from a colonial backwater to a place to either further national and personal
goals or a place where lifelong issues stem from.
However, this was not the only way the experiments affected the islands they
took place on. They altered the relationships and bonds were formed and even created
ones that would have been unlikely to occur in other contexts. A major change came
13

in the new divisions between Christmas and Malden Islands. Malden Island became
the place where the higher-ranking officers lived whereas Christmas became the place
of work and where lower-ranking officers resided. Due to the small size of the islands,
Oulton bonded with his fellow commanding officers and the meetings became much
less formal as time went on as a result. Hubbard also commented on how he came like
family with the rest of his squadron, which most likely came from the close proximity
they were living in, without much to do outside of work. Yet, the experiments also
provided an opportunity for different nations to mix. Although many were evacuated
from the islands, a small Gilbertese population remained to work on Operation Grapple.
Due to the lack of sources from Gilbertese people, what is known of their interactions
with the British soldiers primarily come from Oulton’s autobiography. He remembers
them fondly but still saw them as an ‘other’ when describing their customs which were
strange to him.
The Fijians had a different experience. When discussing the earlier
experiments, they found them to be an equaliser of sorts. Many discussed how they
were regarded less on racial grounds but more on military rank and how officers of the
same rank were warm and friendly. However, as the experiments went on, they found
that they were marginalised by their fellow soldiers and that older colonial notions of
the ‘other’ resurfaced. Operation Grapple transformed the islands into a melting pot
where officers of various rankings were working together in close quarters as well as
forging bonds with Pacific islanders. Although older hallmarks of colonialism did not
disappear as quickly as the functions of Christmas and Malden Islands did.
Furthermore, it is important to consider how the islands affected British
aspiration for power. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands have long been some of the most
remote islands in the world. This meant that communication with the outside world
was slow and difficult during the nuclear experiments. Moreover, this made it difficult
to get resources to the islands, which were scarce prior to the arrival of the British
military and was exacerbated by the increased population. This meant that morale was
often low for those residing there and may have spurred them on to complete the
mission quicker than originally planned. The amount of resources meant that Grapple
brought a new, transient population to the islands to bring basic necessities. Moreover,
there was little infrastructure outside of the experiments, which meant boredom was
14

frequently felt. Hubbard also commented on the poor weather conditions as there were
frequent tropical storms, and experiments had to be arranged around the weather. The
climate of the islands was an important part of the experiments. The environmental
damage was a key theme of the Fijian testimonies, which is largely missing from other
sources. Overall, it was not just the experiments which shaped the islands, but it was
a symbiotic relationship. When discussing the relationship between Operation Grapple
and British geopolitical power it is important to consider how the islands were affected
as it offers a glimpse into how the British government saw the islands themselves as
well as reflecting how colonial subjects from Pacific islands were impacted.
A Shift in Perspective
The experiments shaped the Gilbert and Ellice Islands as they became the
setting for the British government to achieve their aim of national prestige through the
development of a nuclear bomb. On the 15th March 1957, the Foreign Office wrote a
telegraph to foreign representatives across Asia saying that abandoning the tests would
“leave [Britain] in a position of inferiority to others”. 27 The metropolitan government
saw Operation Grapple as the key to prestige on the global stage and this extended
downward to those working at Christmas Island in the late 1950s. Hubbard, who was
working for the military, saw the advancement of the warfare complex was paramount.
Edgerton has described the British state as a ‘Warfare State’, in which the military
rapidly grew during the 20th century, and the state generally became increasingly
reliant on the military for legitimacy. 28 When reflecting on the larger reasons
surrounding the development of hydrogen bombs, Hubbard praised the government
for maintaining a nuclear deterrent in what were uncertain times. In the third chapter
of his account, he praised the commanding officers for doing their part in re-shaping
“the required state necessary for a future deterrent nuclear force.”. 29 The final chapter
of his autobiography ends with a reflection of the nature of the experiments and nuclear
weaponry in general. He concluded that Operation Grapple was ultimately for the best
as it provided geopolitical stability and the fact that there had not been a nuclear war
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by the time he was writing, in 1985, was proof that this aspect of the experiments were
a success. 30 He noted that the British and American arsenals helped act as a balancing
act which prevented the Cuban Missile Crisis. 31 Hubbard was reflecting as much on
the time he was writing as much as the late 1950s. In the 1980s, Cold War tensions
began to heighten and the discussion around nuclear weaponry became more prevalent.
Perhaps Hubbard did not feel as strongly about the issue of Britain as a balancing force
in the world at the time but used the chance to tell his story to also comment on
contemporary issues. Therefore, the islands took on a different symbolic role in
retrospect as they became a necessity for Britain’s nuclear deterrent, for both the
Foreign Office and the pilot who dropped the bomb, which was beneficial both in the
1950s and when he was writing in the 1980s.
Furthermore, the islands may have been a place to further national prestige, but
they were also a place where Hubbard could advance his own career. He was still quite
young before he arrived in Christmas Island, and he was looking to prove himself to
the higher-ranking officers of the military. When he was chosen to fly the planes,
which would drop the bombs, this excited him. In the introduction to his autobiography,
he wrote that the ability to prove oneself at the “brutal” interview stage was a “clear
indication of future career advancement”. 32 In the introduction, he also thanked the
higher-ranking officers for the opportunity to go to Christmas Island as it gave him the
discipline necessary to advance in his career. 33 Although Hubbard was unfamiliar with
the South Pacific before he set off, it shaped his personal aspirations for power from
an early stage. It was the idea of the islands that shaped his aspirations for power; the
physical islands themselves were irrelevant as long as they could advance his career.
For the young pilot, the islands represented a way of pursuing his personal
goals. This may have been common for many of the young soldiers, particularly for
the ones in Hubbard’s squadron. Operation Grapple was primarily carried out by
young soldiers, some of which were conscripted but it was likely that many wanted to
be involved with the nuclear programme was as means of career advancement.
Therefore, the specific islands did not shape the aspiration for power but what they
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represented did. They offered a ladder to young military personnel, such as Hubbard,
to advance their careers and prove themselves to higher-ranking officers by involving
themselves in a mission of the utmost importance to both the British government and
the military.
When describing dropping the nuclear bomb itself, he recalled the feelings of
awe. When writing about the first time he saw the nuclear explosion, he described it
as “a sight of such majesty and grotesque beauty that it defies adequate description”. 34
Hubbard was describing overwhelming sensations of wonder and dread; he was unable
to fully describe what he saw, even when he was writing nearly thirty years later. The
feelings of awe may have been symbolic of the power and ingenuity of the British
scientists and, by extension, the military. In an unsure geopolitical era, such as the late
1950s, the bomb may have been symbolic of an assurance that Britain was still a great
power, capable of producing something of such power and beauty. His description
juxtaposed the “majesty and grotesque beauty” of the blast, which may have reflected
his conflicted emotions about the bomb. Although in favour of the bomb, he found its
beauty to be “grotesque” as he became aware of the sheer power of a weapon that had
never been seen on such a scale before. To Hubbard, the bomb had been symbolic of
personal and national achievement.
He was also in a unique position as he was one of few men that saw the
explosion from above rather than from a ship like the vast majority of his colleagues.
Once the bomb detonated, it perhaps evoked a sense of satisfaction that his time on the
island had not been wasted. His aspiration for power transformed the islands as they
became the place of success where the sheer power of the hydrogen bomb could be
witnessed. In turn, this shaped Hubbard’s aspiration for power as he was given a
unique vantage point. He became awestruck and, in that, became convinced that
Operation Grapple had not been a waste of time.
However, Hubbard was far from the only lower-ranking officer to be part of
Operation Grapple. The Grapple planning committee also relied heavily on the Fijian
military as it was far simpler, and cheaper, to move Fijian soldiers to Christmas Island
than British ones. The British aspirations for power meant the islands took on a
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different role than for British soldiers, such as Hubbard and Oulton. They became a
place which sparked fear and dread. As Filipe Rogoyawa, a member of the Fijian naval
contingent in March 1957, said: “the explosion was really terrifying”, especially when
thinking of the bomb being dropped on the land. 35 This sentiment was shared by his
fellow serviceman, such as Susitino Lasagavibau who remarked that having seen the
power of atomic weaponry first hand none of the soldiers “would have gone”. 36
Although many across the world in the 1950s felt fear of the newly emerged Cold War
heating up, 37 these fears became much more grounded for the Fijian soldiers,
especially after Micronesia being a major setting for the Second World War. 38
However, Paul Ahpoy, an engineer at the time, felt a sense of relief. He noted that the
“British tests were good” in the sense that they managed to get the Soviet Union to
“reduce its military and nuclear weapons”. 39 This is a rather interesting contrast to the
other Fijian testimonies as it Ahpoy saw a benefit to the nuclear weapons programme.
For him, the British Empire trying to find a new source of power to remain relevant
on the global stage had some benefit and being part of this was a lesser evil than being
exposed to war with the Communist east. For these Fijian soldiers, British aspirations
for power shaped the islands as they became the centre for fear. They also provided
some, as in the case of Ahpoy, a sense of relief that they were part of avoiding a nuclear
war if one had arisen.
Furthermore, it was not just fear, dread, and relief that the bomb evoked as
many of the veterans noted a feeling of awe when they saw the mushroom cloud
hovering about the ocean. Anara Bakale remembered the sound of the “frightening
bomb” decades later. 40 Many of the soldiers told to turn to the blasts by commanding
officers, 41 suggesting a voyeuristic quality to the experiments. Afterall, there was no
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practical need for hundreds of soldiers to witness these experiments. In the 1950s, the
bomb represented geopolitical power. 42 With the Fijian soldiers having to watch the
explosions, these may have served as a reminder of British power to their colonial
subjects, especially as the process of decolonisation had begun and the East of Suez
movement was underway. However, the Fijians were not the only South Pacific
islanders to witness the experiments. There was a small Gilbertese village near
Christmas Island. Mrs Sui Kiritome, the only Gilbertese person to give her account of
what happened, noted “the captain came to [her] husband and invited [them] to
accompany him on the deck to see what happened after the blast”. 43 Initially she was
told she and her family were to be repatriated to Tarawa, but this didn’t happen until
after witnessing the blast.
Operation Grapple was not simply for the scientists and commanding officer,
but a performative event for everyone involved. For the Fijians, it may have been
symbolic of military might, but for the Gilbertese, the bomb also represented Britain’s
power over the Pacific Islands. The British were able to move the local population at
will, for the goal of maintaining power and relevance on the global stage. Asking the
Gilbertese population to witness the blast also served as a reminder that the British
were in control of the colony, both the people and their islands. Therefore, Operation
Grapple transformed into Christmas Island into a place where South Pacific colonial
subjects could marvel at the power of the British Empire.
Although Christmas Island may be remembered as a place of terror, where
people could marvel at the power of the British bomb and state, the commanding
officer, Oulton, offered a more idyllic depiction of the islands. Throughout his
autobiography, he held a rather romantic view of Christmas and Malden Islands. He
was left with the impression that the South Pacific Islands were a place of outstanding
beauty. Oulton even opened his autobiography describing the “brilliant light from the
tropical full moon, turning the showers of coral into gleaming silver fountains”. 44 This
set the tone for the best of the book, which often had dramatic flourishes for describing
the events, but it is still a rather idyllic way of remembering the islands. Opening the
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autobiography with this description gives the reader a rather serene image of the
islands which may have come from a desire to give the impression that the experiments
were a success and that the islands provided a tranquil backdrop for them. Oulton
oversaw the experiments and he wanted to give the impression that they occurred
without any issues as it would have reflected badly upon him. His aspirations for power
were successful, as Operation Grapple did produce a functioning hydrogen bomb.
When writing retrospectively, this success was reflected in his descriptions of the
islands themselves.
However, this stands in contrast to how the islands have been perceived by the
veterans, who served there, and their widows. For the Fijian soldiers, the island came
to be associated with fears of the future. As Filipe Rogoyawa, a member of the Fijian
naval contingent in March 1957, said: “the explosion was really terrifying”, especially
when thinking of the bomb being dropped on the land. 45 For him, the island was
symbolic of what could become of the world if a large-scale war were to break out
again. However, for the widows of the veterans, Operation Grapple marked the
beginning of what came to make their married lives difficult. Cagimudre Levenilov,
the widow of a Fijian solider, discussed how her husband was unable to take cold food
and drinks and frequently had chronic diarrhoea and stomach problems. 46 Sainimili
Nakurama, the widow of a Fijian engineer, had a similar experience. She recalled how
her late husband’s life was plagued by illness and they regularly had to visit the
hospital. 47 For these widows, Christmas Island came to symbolise the origin of their
husband’s health problems, which impacted their married life.
Nakurama also noted having three miscarriages, which she attributes to her
husband’s radiation exposure. 48 She was not alone. Other Fijian veterans, such as Niko
Buke, noted that he long suffered fertility issues due to his time on Christmas Island. 49
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Those who were able to have children, such as Emori Ligicia, 50 noted issues with their
offspring. Whilst discussing the effects of witnessing the bomb, Sui Kiritome recalled
how her daughter, born in July 1958, had blood coming out of every cavity when she
was born. 51 The nuclear bombs and the islands where they were dropped perhaps
became the physical embodiment for the grief they had to go through. Therefore,
Christmas Island took on a symbolic role for them. For Oulton, Christmas Island was
the place where his mission for a megaton weapon was a success, whereas for the
Fijians, and their wives, it was the source of health problems for them and their families.
The islanders were unable to have the family life they perhaps envisioned when they
got married. Operation Grapple helped transform Christmas Island into an enduring
symbol of loss for the ladies, who lost both their husbands to the effects of radiation
exposure and their hopes for the future.
Moreover, the British metropolitan government were not only criticised for
their negligent safety procedures but their secretive nature. The clandestine nature of
the tests was always a key part of the planning due as the British government and
military did not want their secrets to fall into the wrong hands. The Grapple Task
Force outlined their security classifications numerous times, with the dates, design
details and yield of each experiment being classified “Top Secret”. 52 Although never
stated outright, it is unlikely that the lower-ranking officers were included in this
classification as they most likely wanted a few people to know as possible. Many,
including Ratu Inoke Bainimara, the appointed leader of the Fijian branch, noted that
the British government had not told them of the full extent of what the experiments
would entail. 53 As many Fijian soldiers have said since then, they would not have gone
to the Gilbert Islands if they knew the true nature of Operation Grapple. 54 Therefore,
the British government was continuously secretive with imperial subjects in the 1950s.
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Although, it is worth noting that the Fijian soldiers were speaking
retrospectively. The issue of colonial responsibility may not have been as strongly
considered when they were on the island. But this recollection demonstrates how the
Fijian soldiers remember the empire as a secretive structure. In this regard, the British
colonial structure was inherently deceptive. Afterall, in order to ensure Fijian
cooperation, the British government were selective in what information they gave. 55
Although this owed much to the geopolitical situation of the 1950s; not wanting to let
the Soviet Union know the full extent of the nuclear trials. However, they were still
acting disingenuously. Ultimately, how the Fijian veterans feel in respect to the empire
when reflecting in the 1990s illuminates on the of the impacts of Operation Grapple
memories of irresponsibility and deception. The megaton mission affected how the
Fijian soldiers regard Christmas Island as it was a place of secrecy. It was a place
where they were useful in carrying out the mission but not trustworthy enough to share
vital secrets with, which in turn affected how the veterans would view the British
Empire in the decades following the experiments. Ultimately, Operation Grapple was
a part of the British Empire in the late 1950s as it affected how colonial subjects
perceived it long after they were no longer formally part of Britain’s world system.
Forming New Bonds
Operation Grapple did not just shape how the Gilbert and Ellice Islands were
perceived by those who lived there, but the experiments helped shape the relationships
what were formed there. A key example was the division between higher-ranking
officers and those they commanded, as seen through the new divisions between
Malden and Christmas Islands. Throughout his autobiography, Oulton went into detail
about the different functions the two islands had. Both were used throughout Operation
Grapple although they had different functions. Christmas Island was where most of
the action took place with the majority of the military personnel residing there and
most of the scientific data being stationed there. By contrast, Malden Island is much
smaller and was used to house the higher-ranking officers, such as Oulton. 56 The
aspiration to develop a functioning hydrogen bomb transformed the two islands in the
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Gilbert and Ellice Islands by giving them separate functions. There was a clear divide
for Oulton between the two as one was a place of work and the other for habitation.
However, it also provided a physical barrier between higher and lower-ranking
officers. Malden Island arguably became a place of higher prestige compared to
Christmas Island as in order to go there during Operation Grapple, one had to have
earned a particular military ranking. This made sense at the time as Malden Island is
much smaller and could not realistically house the rapid increase in population. This
was most likely the main motivator in choosing Malden to house the higher-ranking
officers. Although, Oulton did not necessarily speak of this divide positively, he wrote
that he found the travelling between the islands rather tedious and unnecessary as it
caused needless difficulties in communicating with those on Christmas Island, and
therefore, organising the experiments. 57 The division caused by the new functions
Christmas and Malden Island took on did not necessarily work in favour of Oulton and
the other commanding officers. Their aspirations for fulling the British government’s
desire for a strong nuclear arsenal transformed the islands by giving them new
functions which went beyond the sea which separated them. For the first time in the
islands’ history, they were divided by status. Such a division became a minor
hindrance to the experiments as it led to unnecessary travel time which hampered
communication with the other officers who lived on Christmas Island.
When it came to finer details being planned at Christmas Island, Oulton noted
that the meetings became less formal as time went on. 58 This may have been down to
various factors, the time constraints on each experiment being one of them. The later
grapple experiments were planned at haste at the metropole and this could have been
reflected in the meetings taking place at the test site. 59 However, the close quarters the
commanding officers lived in may have also played a role. Unlike other military
missions, the commanding officers were working and living in very close quarters.
The close proximity of the living and working arrangements may have also led to the
experiments being planned less formally as there may have been little separation
between working and living. The small nature of the islands shaped Oulton and his
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peers’ aspirations for power by informalizing them. The close quarters and lack of
resources may have led to the commanding officers sharing the British government’s
desire to complete the mission swiftly as they would have wanted to leave the islands
to a much more comfortable environment as well as furthering national prestige and
displaying effective leadership. The islands shaped the way Operation Grapple was
run as the small and remote nature led to close interpersonal relationships.
In turn, this led to planning the finer points of the tests being decided on much
more informally. Initially, the higher-ranking officers would have shared the
government’s desire to create a megaton weapon quickly and being able to do so would
have reflected well on them. However, with little to do outside of Operation Grapple,
they may have wanted to complete the mission as soon as possible just so they could
leave. Ultimately, the islands helped to foster close bonds among the commanding
officers, which helped to lessen the formality of the planning meetings.
Moreover, the bonding that Oulton most likely experienced extended to his
interactions with the personnel he oversaw. Much like with his fellow higher-ranking
officers, Oulton also had to interact with a variety of different people who worked on
the islands due to his position of overseeing the entire mission. He noted that “immense
and important task was only made possible by the close integration of the Royal Army
Ordnance Corps and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering teams – not
normal to Army practice”. 60 Operation Grapple helped to foster new relationships
between different military groups who would not have worked with each other in
previous contexts. Oulton’s comment about the unusual nature of the Army and the
engineering teams working together perhaps reflects the military’s changing nature in
the late 1950s.
The army was becoming more closely integrated with the scientific community
in order to maintain relevance and prestige on the global stage. 61 This had a knock-on
effect with those who lived on the islands as cooperation with different groups took
place for the first time. British aspirations for power ultimately effected the
relationships formed on Christmas Island as the nature for power shifted. Oulton also
fondly remembered the comradery between the different members of the crew which
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led to high morale. 62 However, he may have been reluctant to admit that there were
often periods of low morale, as Oulton reflected on as it would have reflected poorly
on his leadership, which extended beyond the smooth running of testing weaponry, but
the welfare of the soldiers as low morale could have damaged the running of the
experiments. The space of Christmas Island was transformed into one where different
groups of people interacted in a way which was not known to the British military
beforehand as the soldiers and the scientists were working toward the same goal. This
also reflected the changing nature of power, and British hegemony, as military
operations became closely linked with scientific knowledge.
This sentiment was shared by Hubbard, who spoke of the familial bonds that
formed between him and his fellow soldiers during their times on the island. Operation
Grapple shaped the Gilbert Islands by providing a new social structure as the soldiers
bonded. Due to the remote nature of the islands, many of the soldiers which Hubbard
interacted with became like family to him. 63 Throughout his autobiography, he
regularly spoke of how close he and the rest of the squadron had become. It was only
natural that such a close relationship would form given how remote Christmas Island
is and how scarce communication with the outside world was. The island became a
place of harmony. The men he formed a close bond with all shared the same goal of
completing the megaton mission successfully and using it as a springboard for career
progression. When it came to finishing their time on the island, Hubbard wrote that it
was like a “tremendous wrench to hand over my beloved squadron to other hands”. 64
Even when reflecting nearly thirty years later, he still looked back on the squadron
fondly.
Christmas Island may have taken on a symbolic meaning to Hubbard as a place
for career progression and the chance for his country to make gains in the Cold War
but whilst there, the remote nature of the islands helped shaped his perception of his
fellow servicemen. In this aspect, the island became a place of harmony and added a
new dimension to his goal of career progression as those working with and beneath
him. This in turn would have shaped Christmas Island as a place. Prior to the Second
World War, there had been very little military activity there. However, the Japanese
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and American military efforts were in the context of aggressive battle. The military
comradery that Hubbard describes would have been entirely unique. Operation
Grapple helped shaped aspirations of power by transforming Christmas Island into a
place where there was a less aggressive, familial structure.
However, it is worth noting that the only interactions that took place during
Operation Grapple were not entirely between British soldiers, as a small indigenous
population were not evacuated from the colony. Operation Grapple marked a new,
extended, interaction between the British military and the Gilbertese population.
Throughout his autobiography, Oulton recalled various interactions with the native
population. He generally spoke highly of them, remarked that they were a “great help”
to the mission and Operation Grapple’s success relied as much on their aid as
cooperation between different governmental departments. 65 He also wrote that the
emotional goodbyes at the end of the mission included a small platoon of Gilbertese
police, 66 which suggests that British officers managed some sort of integration into the
society on Christmas Island.
Much like with the higher-ranking officers and the different departments
collaborating, Operation Grapple changed Christmas Island into a place where the
British military could integrate with the indigenous population that were not evacuated.
Although in one chapter, he wrote of a party the Gilbertese hosted, which he was
invited to. With the mission itself, Oulton may have regarded the Gilbertese as no
different to the rest of the personnel under his leadership, but outside of that, he still
saw them as an ‘other’ group. He noted the unusual dress with “some [wearing] a
singlet, some topless”. 67 He went on to refer to the music in inverted commas,
suggesting that it did not merit the description of ‘music’. He also remembered that
when the Gilbertese girls tried to include them in the party, they “without much
ceremony plonked the garlands more or less around the necks of the other visitors”. 68
Operation Grapple may have transformed Christmas Island into a place where,
according to Oulton, different groups worked together harmoniously but older
attitudes regarding the indigenous population persisted. Although grateful for their
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contribution to the mission, Oulton did come to view them in the same way he saw the
lower-ranking British officers. The Gilbertese remained an ‘other’ to Oulton, and a
useful ‘other’ at that. His experiences on Christmas Island may have changed the
groups of people he interacted with, but this was not necessarily enough to completely
erode the attitudes British leaders had toward their colonial subjects. This reflected the
changed in British aspirations for power more generally. The nuclear bomb came to
represent power in the Cold War era, but even the nuclear bomb was not strong enough
to entirely eradicate attitudes toward colonial subjects.
Whereas this was not necessarily the case for the Fijian soldiers who were
conscripted to help with the megaton mission. During the early stages of Operation
Grapple the commanding officers were still above all the other military personnel, 69
but many of the Fijian soldiers noted that they found the British and New Zealand
soldiers to be warm and friendly. Ratu Inoke Bainimara recalled a sense of comradery
and the different groups “socialised really well” and “it seemed as if we all knew each
other before meeting”. 70 The nuclear experiments equalised the Pacific islanders and
the British forces, as they were seen as military personnel rather than members of the
metropole and the colonies, which would have been commonplace before the Second
World War. 71 Moreover, the flash suits themselves helped with the process. Ratu
Inoke Bainimara noted that the only way to tell soldiers apart was by the badge they
wore. 72 This sentiment was shared by Paul Ahpoy who noted that he could only tell
the other soldiers apart by the language they spoke. 73 The flash suits themselves can
be seen as symbolic of the change in attitude that mixing the different groups together.
When aboard the ship, the military rank transcended national boundaries. Operation
Grapple meant that the perceptions of British and colonial other no longer applied,
although temporarily, it was the role on the island which became more important.
Therefore, the experiences of the Fijian soldiers may have been marked by fear, dread
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and a feeling of deception on part of the British, but the nuclear experiments allowed
for a space for the soldiers to transcended colonial boundaries. Operation Grapple
helped change Christmas Island into a place where it was not necessarily nationhood
which divided people but military rank.
However, this was not to last. As the experiments went on, the Fijians faced
‘othering’ in a similar way as the Gilbertese officers did in Oulton’s description. The
inequality between the British and Fijian military personnel grew over the ten-month
period on Christmas Island. Although there was inequality with pay and the amount of
time spent on duty, 74 perhaps the starkest noted was regarding safety procedures.
Initially, flash-suits were given to every member of the crew on the ship which was
sailed out to witness the explosions, and they acted as an equaliser between the
different groups of military personnel present. Ratu Inoke Bainimara noted that the
only way to tell who the other soldiers apart was by the badge they were wearing. 75
This sentiment was shared by Paul Ahpoy who noted that he could only tell the other
soldiers apart by the language they spoke. 76 Perhaps the flash suits themselves were
symbolic of the change in attitude that mixing the different groups together. When
aboard the ship, the military rank transcended national boundaries. Operation Grapple
meant that the perceptions of British and colonial other no longer applied, although
temporarily, it was the role on the island which became more important.
However, this did not last. With pressures from the metropole to produce a
controlled megaton blast, according to the Fijian veterans of the later experiments,
safety procedures became relaxed. Pita Rokoratu recalled that they “just wore out
normal daily working clothes. There were long pants, long sleeved shirts, hat and boots.
That was all [they] wore”. 77 Epi Ratu also shared noted something similar recounting
that “there was nothing else to protect [them] like a safety helmet or something to
protect [their] ears”, which was not the case for their British counterparts. 78 Initially,
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military rank may have superseded nationality, though this was not the case toward
the end of the programme as the safety of the Fijian soldiers became less of a priority.
A common feature of British Imperialism had long been the othering of other groups. 79
However, this was more common in the pre-war era. In the late 1950s, the Empire was
beginning to disintegrate, and the outward notion of othering was much less common.
Operation Grapple may have transformed the colony into a place where military rank
became more important than nationhood, but this faded as the pressure from the
metropole for a functioning megaton weapon mounted and older attitudes came to the
fore. As the experiments went on, Christmas Island’s colonial roots resurfaced with
attitudes toward the Fijians, much like how they did with the Gilbertese Oulton
interacted with.
The Remote Island with Oppressive Weather
Aspirations for power may have shaped the Gilbert and Ellice Islands by
affecting their symbolic nature and transforming them into a place where new bonds
could form but it is also worth considering how the islands in turn affected such
aspirations for power. One such example is the remote nature of Christmas Island.
Even today, the republics which came of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands after
independence, Kiribati and Tuvalu, are some of the most geographically remote
nations on Earth. 80 The remote nature of the islands affected the morale of the British
who came there in the 1950s. Oulton noted that telephone communications with the
outside world were infrequent and patchy. 81 The infrequent contact with the outside
world may have affected the way he approached Operation Grapple by spurring him
on to bring successful results so that he, and the other officers, may have been offered
some respite, and return to the life he left behind.
Although, he also noted that the morale was high despite separation from
families. 82 Oulton may have been playing down this aspect of life at Christmas Island
as further missions were planned beyond Grapple Z. The success of the Grapple series
would have shown the government that he was a capable leader that could excel in a
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matter of the utmost importance. Moreover, when writing after his retirement in the
mid-1980s, he was most likely aware that a state of poor morale would have reflected
poorly on him and his leadership. Downplaying the negative aspects was perhaps a
way of saving face and giving the impression that he was a strong and effective leader
both in the 1950s and in the 1980s. Therefore, the remote nature of the islands affected
Oulton’s aspirations for power by lowering morale of the officers he oversaw, which
may have been a contributing factor to his desire to succeed as he would have felt the
effects of the lack of outside communication as well. In turn, he downplayed the effects
it would have had as it could have reflected poorly on him and his ability to lead an
issue which was of such importance to the British government.
Furthermore, the remote nature of the islands leading to low morale was also
reflected upon in Hubbard’s account of the experiments. He recounted that there were
long periods of time spent along and there was often very little to do when he was not
working. In the seventh chapter of his autobiography, he commented that “boredom in
the evenings, after a while, was the problem”. 83 He remembered bringing a paint by
numbers set but commented that it wasn’t enough to entertain him for very long and
that there was little alternative. 84 Although the islands became a place for Hubbard to
advance his career, and further his nation’s prestige, they offered very little fulfilment
out of that. Perhaps when reflecting on Operation Grapple, he realised that these
aspirations were not enough to offer him a fulfilling life. His primary aim for going to
Christmas Island may have been to further his career goals and, in turn, fulfil the
aspirations for the British government, but this was not enough to sustain him over the
entire period he was based at Christmas Island.
The metropolitan government chose the islands because their remote nature
meant little potential backlash both from a domestic and international level. 85 Those
planning the experiments in London had little interest in the isolated colony outside of
their function to fulfil the megaton mission. The central government and Grapple Task
Force had little interest in the morale and wellbeing of the military personnel, outside
of the effects of radiation exposure, which may explain why it was never discussed.
Hubbard’s personal aspirations shaped the island by changing its symbolic nature to
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the centre for the development of a nuclear deterrent and a place for career progression,
but the islands did influence these aspirations as well. The small and remote nature of
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands meant they offered little in the way of entertainment.
Therefore, the islands narrowed his focus toward these aspirations rather than offering
a fulfilling life and showed the limits of such aspirations as they were only a small part
of Hubbard’s life, which he may have not realised until he was writing his
autobiography decades later.
The low morale felt by many living on Christmas Island did not solely come
from a lack of recreational activities but also the scarce resources also caused by the
remoteness of the islands. Simply put, there were not enough food, clothes, and
medical supplies to go around. In his autobiography, Oulton makes frequent references
to the lack of resources and notably compared the facilities there to that of a “small
industrial town”. 86 The periods of low morale may have owed much to the lack of
recreational activities but also of the dearth of basic necessities. To carry out the
experiments, a large population increase was required which was not sustainable for
such a small and isolated island. Operation Grapple helped shape the space it took
place in by stretching the resources the islands had to offer beyond breaking point with
the dramatic influx of people they had to support.
Yet, it went further than this. Much like with Hubbard’s complaints of a lack
of infrastructure beyond those needed for the experiments, the metropolitan
government were perhaps more focused on the experiments than the provisions for
those carrying them out. The inconveniences caused by using Malden Island as a place
to house the commanding officers demonstrates the mindset of those back in the
metropole. They were completely focused on the development of the megaton bomb
with little consideration for anything else when it came to those on the ground. This is
perhaps why such issues were not discussed until much later in the planning process.
Infrastructure for the new accommodation was raised as early as October 1956. 87 By
contrast, it was not until December 1957 that the issue of food and water supply was
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raised by the Fijian military. 88 Though, this would be expected from the British
metropolitan government as their concerns were with geopolitical stability rather than
the comfort of soldiers in a remote colony. However, this mindset extended to Oulton
and his peers. At the time, he was most likely concerned with meeting the wishes of
his superiors in London rather than ensuring the wellbeing of the officers he oversaw.
When it came to plan the finer details of the mission, the distribution and flow of
resources was in his portfolio, although he did not really acknowledge this in his
autobiography. His lamentation of the lack of resources leading to low morale at times
may have come from writing in retrospect. Writing some decades after the event would
have allowed him the space to reflect on the causes of low morale. Overall, the
remoteness of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands affected aspirations for power by
highlighting then narrow focus of Whitehall and lowering morale on the islands
themselves.
The scarce resources did not only lead to low morale, but also a change to the
demographics of those on the island. Due to the need for basic resources, such as food
and water, a lot of these good were imported, meaning there was a constant flow of
people. Little is known about the transient population as they are largely absent from
the body of sources from the different governmental departments, military, and
commissioners in the Pacific. However, Oulton wrote about them in his autobiography.
He noted that fresh water supply was an issue and the task force had to rely on navy
ships from various nations to import it. 89 Further on in his account, he noted that the
experiments relied on cooperation from the West, 90 not just for scientific input but for
the basics as well. Many new faces were required to bring the resources needed to
sustain the long-term population. The aspiration for a functioning megaton weapon
may have changed the demography of the islands with the British making up a majority
of the population for the first time in the history of the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony.
Yet, it was not as simple to view this new population as homogenous. With the
more permanent population, there was also a transient population required to sustain
them. International cooperation was paramount to the success of the experiments (See
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chapter III). The ships transporting the goods primarily came from Australia and New
Zealand. 91 Historically, the British had left the two Pacific dominions to run the
smaller colonies. Yet, this was often accomplished from afar. The scarce resources
forced changes in the remote islands as it led to both low morale and a new stream of
resources from other nations to sustain the more permanent population. In turn,
Operation Grapple shaped the Gilbert and Ellice Islands by transforming the
demography of the islands with the influx of British people, but also brought with it a
transient population from nearby colonies. The islands shaped aspirations for power
by furthering the need for international cooperation. The mission would not have been
successful if it were not for other nations helping to sustain the long-term population.
It was not just the remote nature of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands that shaped
British desire for a functioning hydrogen bomb. The environment itself played a role.
Hubbard’s first impression of the island was that it was barren due to the environment
not encouraging the growth of much vegetation in the island’s centre. 92 He may have
wanted to go there for various reasons, such as the advancement of his career and
national prestige, but he was not too keen on where he had to go in order to achieve
these goals. Moreover, he noted the appalling weather conditions, such as the constant
storms and tropical heat. The “uncomfortable weather conditions […] made life made
life uncomfortable for all concerned” he wrote about the later part of his post at
Christmas Island. 93 Toward the end of his autobiography, he wrote that the tropical
conditions made Grapple Z difficult to go ahead with. 94 The difficulties of the final
experiments demonstrate how the environment shaped the experiments as they were
weather dependent. The islands were prone to tropical storms and the event of rain
meant that the experiments would have had to have been delayed. Hubbard saw
Christmas Island as a small barren island that was oppressive due to the environmental
conditions. This would have exacerbated the boredom felt outside of his military duties.
Due to the small size and remote nature of Christmas Island, there was no
infrastructure for things such as sport, radio, and other leisure activities. The
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oppressive environment would have made him, and the rest of the military personnel,
uncomfortable in their boredom.
On top of this, the experiments were weather dependent, which meant that the
aspect of their time which gave any satisfaction on Christmas Island could have been
held back by the climate. The environment shaped Hubbard’s aspirations for power as
they were dependent on it. Christmas Island may have been transformed into a place
for personal and national prestige, but technological development was no match for
something as basic as the weather conditions present in the South Pacific. The setting
of the experiments shaped both Hubbard and his nation’s aspirations for power by
narrowing their focus entirely on Operation Grapple and dictating when the
experiments could go ahead, if at all.
In addition, the climate and location of the islands shaped the experiments but
there were profound changes to the islands in the form of environmental damage. It is
difficult to separate the people of the South Pacific from the islands they inhabited.95
Many of the testimonies from Fijian veterans had environmental themes to them.
Ravuama Vakatuturagania remembered Christmas Island as being a barren place that
had already suffered major damage by the time he arrived to help construct some of
the buildings. 96 Malakai Niubasaga also had similar observations as he noticed that
everything was black, and black up to 60 miles away from where the bombs were
actually dropped.

97

The shock is understandable, especially when considering

Christmas Island would not have been too dissimilar to those in Fiji. The wildlife was
also noted by Epi Ratu, who recalled the “burnt and dead birds” between 1958 and
1959.
The commanding officers were aware of the damage that was being done in
the pursuit of a megaton bomb. Epeli Cama recounted the British showing them a
video, which stated the South East portion of the island was off limits due to the
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damage caused by the bombs of the earlier tests. 98 The diet was also entangled with
the environment of Christmas Island. Eating contaminated fish was commonplace, 99
whereas Emori Ligicia noted that the “military had all the power to stop [them]. They
knew the many effects of the bombs.” 100 Many of the veterans see being in the noxious
environment as being the cause for the health issues faced in subsequent decades. The
British possessing knowledge, and apparent apathy toward, the environment that the
lower ranking officers had to inhabit added to the perception of the Empire being
irresponsible and careless. British Imperialism was remembered as being reckless and
uncaring about the islands themselves as well as a those who had to live there.
Therefore, it becomes difficult to separate the islands from the Islanders as imperial
policy seemed to have little regard for both of them. Overall, Operation Grapple had a
profound impact on the Christmas Island as it led to environmental damage and
represented a disregard to the environmental damage in the 1950s as long as it was the
megaton bomb with was the most important thing.
Conclusion
British aspirations for power hinged on the nuclear bomb in the late 1950s, as
evening out the Cold War was a top priority for the British government. This had a
profound impact on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The most obvious impact being the
environmental damage caused to the region through violent and destructive weaponry
being tried for the first time there. However, in order for the mission to be completed
in a short timeframe, a lot of people across various military and scientific departments
were needed. The islands affected how the experiments were run, as they were weather
dependent, and most of the resources needed to be imported. The scarce resources and
small area contributed to periods of low morale as there was little space for
infrastructure for leisure activities in the soldiers’ free time. It also led to infrequent
contact with the outside world. All of this combined meant that periods of low morale
were inevitable. Although, this aspect is often downplayed as it may have reflected
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poorly on those writing the accounts and the lack of nuclear war afterwards may have
demonstrated the efficacy of the nuclear deterrent.
In turn, the experiments affected how the islands were perceived as they had
different meanings for various people. When examining the testimonial and
autobiographical accounts the impact Operation Grapple had on the islands becomes
clear. Many of them discuss the small and remote nature of the islands. One the one
hand, this meant that the scarce resources Christmas Island could produce were
stretched to breaking point. On the other, this helped to bring people together. Hubbard
and his crew became like family, which may not have been as likely in another context.
Oulton also extended this view by recounting that the bonding that took place
transcended departments and led to collaboration which would not have taken place if
not for the military’s increasing reliance on the scientific community. However, it was
not only new relations between departments that were forged on Christmas Island. The
increased presence of the British in the islands meant that the relationship with South
Pacific Islanders altered. The Fijian military proved to be invaluable to the Grapple
Task Force as they made up the bulk of the lower-ranking officers involved in
Operation Grapple. Initially, the Fijians recalled their experiences interacting with the
British officers positively as they were treated with the same respect as British officers
of the same ranking. Operation Grapple transformed Christmas Island into a place
where the lines of division were based on the position in the military rather than
nationhood.
However, this was not to last. As the experiments went on, the amount of safety
equipment depleted which led to anecdotes about the British soldiers being given
preference when distributing such equipment. Christmas Island may have been a place
where rank mattered more than nationhood, but this ultimately had its limits. A
common theme of colonialism was divisions based on ethnic, and national, grounds
rather than job status. This seemed to lessen during Operation Grapple but did not
entirely disappear. When it came to discussing the British Empire retrospectively, the
Fijian accounts offer an interesting insight. By a minority, the British bomb was seen
as a force for good as they provided a balancing force in the world which prevented a
nuclear war in the 20th century. However, there were plenty who remembered the
British Empire as irresponsible and negligent, which caused long-term health issues
for the remainder of many lives. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands became a place where
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the device which represented geopolitical relevance could be witnessed first-hand but
it came to represent loss and lifetime of issues for the husbands and children of the
widows of the men who were posted at Christmas Island.
Overall, when looking at the link between Operation Grapple and British
Imperialism, the examination of space and place shows the changing nature of power
and how the Britain, and its colonial subjects, responded to it. Christmas and Malden
Islands may have been an obvious choice as they were extremely remote, and the
experiments were unlikely to meet opposition because of this. However, the islands
meant much more than that. The islands altered the experiments, and in turn the
experiments shaped the islands. This extended to colonial rule as the changes
Operation Grapple brought ran beyond the areas outlined to the administration of the
colony itself.
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Introduction
The Gilbert and Ellice Islands had their first contact with Europeans in the
1820s but were not formally annexed until the 1880s. Since their formal annexation,
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands were considered no more than a colonial backwater
which provided the metropole with a modest income. 101 With the onset of Operation
Grapple in 1956, the most noticeable change to the colony was the increased British
presence, which had been minimal until then. This was a rather dramatic
transformation, and the question of how colonial rule in the Gilbert and Ellice Island
Colony was shaped by Operation Grapple. This was apparent in many obvious ways.
The population increase needed to carry out the experiments meant new provisions
were needed, such as housing, food, and medical care. However, with this came the
question of which branch of the government was to be funding this. It was soon
decided that the Ministry of Supply, a new branch of the military, as to take on much
of the financial burden of the experiments. This, in turn, raised issues of who
administered the colony, its inhabitants, as well as the exchange of information. This
then led to confusion and tension between the different departments, most notably the
Ministry of Supply and the Colonial Office, who the commissioners that lived in the
South Pacific answered to. Ultimately, the basis for keeping the colony in the post-war
era was transformed by Operation Grapple as it became the centre for military exploits
rather than economic provision. However, this was not necessarily a new phenomenon
for the islanders, as the Second World War saw Japanese annexation, followed by
American liberation, both of which saw a military administration of the islands.
Therefore, it was only a big change on the part of the British, rather than the region
itself.
The tensions between the newer branches of the military and the established
Colonial Office did not necessarily extend to those on the ground. Fijian soldiers were
moved to provide the manpower necessary to carry out the experiments, many of
which noted that there was an atmosphere of camaraderie and that the British and
Fijian soldiers integrated well. Perhaps the otherization between British and colonial
subject lessened as they were part of the same military complex which formed the new
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foundation of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. However, this integration of the different
forces hinged on proficiency in the English language, which was preferred by those
planning the experiments. Overall, the basis for continuing colonisation in the region
may have shifted but there were still some features which remained, of which the
preference for speaking English was emblematic. Moreover, there were international
repercussions of Operation Grapple. The colony briefly became the centre for the
South Pacific Empire. Many of the other islands were used to house scientific
equipment, some of which were not under British sovereignty. The experiments were
a Pan-Pacific operation, and the desire to develop a megaton weapon was more
important to the British government than where the boundaries between colonies lay.
Operation Grapple was not contained by pre-existing colonial boundaries. The mission
transformed colonial rule in the Gilbert and Ellice islands by making such boundaries
more permeable.
Using islands which were not under British sovereignty also suggested that
these boundaries were less relevant on a global scale as Britain developing their
nuclear arsenal also had ramifications in the ongoing Cold War. The United States may
not have directly aided in the success of Operation Grapple but would benefit from its
success as Britain was a strategic ally in the European theatre of the Cold War. Also,
once the experiments were over, the Gilbert and Ellice islands became symbolic of
British power on a global stage. They were to be the centre of further experiments
before the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 prevented them. This transformation saw the
continued subordination of colonial subjects as well as the continued status of fluid
colonial boundaries. The nuclear experiments also ushered in a new era of British
imperialism by introducing military rule of the colony, with undefined boundaries.
Although this was not a permanent change, it did shape the mindsets of those in power
as a new form of imperialism in the region offered a chance to maintain geopolitical
power in an era of uncertainty.
The continued presence of the United Kingdom in the South Pacific also
demonstrated the limits of the ‘East of Suez’ movement. The British Empire was
generally moving from a state of formal imperialism to becoming the Commonwealth
known today. However, the new military empire in the South Pacific, with the
intention of furthering military technology, shows that the British government were
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not necessarily committed to decolonisation as much as they were committed to
maintaining power and hegemony on the global stage. Operation Grapple ultimately
shaped colonial rule as it offered a new form of imperialism in the region one with an
increased British presence that offered them a platform to demonstrate their global
relevance in the post-war era. Overall, Operation Grapple had a profound, if not shortlived, impact on colonial rule in the Gilbert and Ellice Island colony that extended
beyond the tiny islands where the bombs were dropped.
The Improved Colony
In order to proceed with Operation Grapple, better provisions were needed to
ensure its success, especially considering that the population of the islands was going
to increase dramatically with an influx of white British soldiers and workers from Fiji.
Prior to the Second World War, there were very few buildings or roads on the islands,
meaning that the infrastructure needed to support long-term residents needed to be
improved. This was one of the first issues to be raised in a planning meeting on the 8th
October 1956. When discussing the forthcoming experiments, the Resident
Commissioner of the Colonies stated that new medical staff were needed along with
new housing for the military, and an extension to the school. 102 The majority of these
measures eventually came to fruition, 103 meaning the Operation Grapple shaped the
colony in the early years as it offered a chance for new infrastructure which had not
previously been seen in the colony on this scale.
However, there was much doubt over who would be bankrolling this exactly.
Normally, any funds would have come from the revenue generated by the colony, or
from the Colonial Office if needed. When discussing the issue of financing the
development needed for Operation Grapple, the Resident Commissioner suggested
that the military should be the ones to pay for this as the new accommodation and
medical staff were principally there for the military’s benefit. 104 This was a sign of
things to come in regard to the planning of Operation Grapple as uncertainty within
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the different administrative departments would become a key part of the experiments.
The nuclear tests shaped colonial rule of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands as it, at least
theoretically, improved the facilities available on the islands. It is unclear exactly
whether the islanders themselves benefited from this change. However, with the
development of the colony, the administration of the islands changed as the economic
uncertainty arose, which would last for years to come.
The economic confusion that arose with Operation Grapple also extended to
the administration of the colony which. At times it was equally as unclear who was in
charge of the islands. Prior to the disruption of the Second World War, the Gilbert and
Ellice Colony was administered by a Resident Commissioner who reported to the High
Commissioner of the Western Pacific, based in Fiji. 105 However, this changed with the
increased interest from the British Government in regard to using the islands for
Operation Grapple. Although officially the commissioners were still running the
colony, the Ministry of Supply was in control of the experiments, which effectively
put them in charge of the colony. The Ministry of Supply was an organisation which
supplied the armed forces with any necessary equipment from 1939-59, including the
development of any nuclear weaponry. 106 In a letter on the 25th August 1957 to the
colony to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Resident Commissioner
expressed his concerns over the administration of the colony. He discussed how the
new air strips and military bases were making the colony difficult to administer due to
their permanent nature disrupting the collection of copra supply. 107 His frustration
most likely came from the lack of consultation regarding the building of such
structures. This marked a change in the dynamics of the running of the colony. The
planning and development were no longer left to the commissioners based in the
Pacific, but a division of the military based in London. The Resident Commissioner
ended his letter by suggesting that the military purchase Christmas Island from the
government and that he essentially become an administrator. 108
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The extent of the impact on the lives of the native Gilbertese population
remains unclear. Although the suggestion of military purchase may have been written
in frustration, it is also worth noting that he was writing in confidence to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies. 109 The Secretary of State for the Colonies was a senior
position in the government at the time, so airing these concerns with him implies that
the Resident Commissioner’s concerns over the administration of the colony were
serious and the power dynamic within the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had an uncertain
future in the summer of 1957. Therefore, Operation Grapple altered the structure of
the colony in which the bombs were dropped as the administration became uncertain
as it shifted from the established commissioners to the military based at the metropole.
Also, the Colonial Office also shared the view that the Ministry of Supply as
being in charge rather than the commissioners themselves. Prior to the development of
a nuclear arsenal, the colonial office had little interest in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands,
viewing them as a backwater that the management of which could be outsourced to
commissioners based in the Pacific. 110 In a draft letter from the Colonial Office in 1957,
D. J. Derx wrote how the department had been discussing the organisation of Grapple
X with the Ministry of Supply but had failed to notify the Resident Commissioner of
any plans being put in place. 111 Derx discussed the importance of involving the
commissioner in these discussions, and how the Colonial Office was going to urge the
Ministry of Supply to start consulting the existing administration present on the islands
more. 112 Operation Grapple may have caused a schism between the elites in charge of
the islands, but the Colonial Office was keen to bridge the divide. However, Derx cited
the failure to keep the Resident Commissioner in the loop on the “speed with which
[Grapple X] is having to be mounted”. 113 When considering this in the light of the
power dynamic moving in a way against the Resident Commissioner, the reason he
may have been uninformed could have been an oversight. The administration of the
colony not only moved away from the Pacific to London but perhaps also in the minds
of the branches of the British government themselves, which suggests a greater
109
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strategic importance of the colony in the late 1950s. The Resident Commissioner may
not have been fully informed because of his dwindling influence in the region.
Therefore, a major change that Operation Grapple elevated the status of the Gilbert
and Ellice Islands within the larger framework of a shrinking empire. The colony had
temporarily become one of the most important to the metropolitan government.
Whereas the role of the importance of those administering the colony shrank in
conjunction to the growth of status for the colony.
Moreover, the Ministry of Supply were given financial control of the
experiments, which gave them a say in the running of the colony during this period. In
a letter from the Grapple Task Force on the 31st December 1957, Guy Western, a
Captain for the Vice Air Marshall, wrote to the Colonial Office clarifying that the
Ministry of Supply “agreed to meet the cost of pay and allowances of these personnel
while they are employed on Christmas Island”. 114 Although he only referred to
responsibility for the military personnel, they did make up the majority of the
population for the duration of Operation Grapple meaning that the Ministry of Supply
were effectively given control of the colony for as long as they needed it.
However, this control was always constrained by the metropole. In a letter from
10th June the following year, the Treasury was displeased with paying for a substantial
increase in Fijian soldiers on the island and a “less careful regard” for the Fijian budget
had become necessary. 115 With the financial control of the colony, their attention was
firmly on improving conditions for the military personnel rather than the native
population. Operation Grapple may have improved the infrastructure on the islands,
but this was mainly for the betterment of the military who had to live there, meaning
that these developments were made with the short term in mind. This is emblematic of
the way the British government approached their nuclear arsenal, and their
international position, in the 1950s. Financial control was given to the military as long
as it needed it, which was primarily for a period of less than five years, which is what
caused the Colonial Office to see their position as becoming increasingly irrelevant
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and subsequent confusion arising. Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule of the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands by handing financial control to the military and leading to
the myopic view of how the colony could be administered.
However, this did not necessarily mean that the Colonial Office was
completely disregarded. When the Task Force Committee decided to use Fijian
soldiers, the Colonial Officer saw themselves, at least initially, as responsible for the
Fijians present on Christmas Island. In a draft letter on the 19th May 1956, Derx
asserted that “the government of Fiji should be our responsibility”. 116 In the initial
stages the Colonial Office took responsibility for negotiating with the Fijian
government to get the required military personnel. Although the responsibility for the
Fijians would eventually be transferred to the Ministry of Supply, the Colonial Office
still retained responsibility for getting the officers to Christmas Island in the first place.
It is unclear whether Derx envisioned this responsibility sustaining until the end of the
mission, but it furthers the point that the Colonial Office may have also been thinking
in the short-term when it came to the administration of the colony. The migration of
Fijian forces could have had potential long-term ramifications for the Pacific islanders
as they may have been required to stay on the island into the 20th century as the
experiments continued. The improved infrastructure may have needed to become
permanent, but this was never discussed. Ultimately, Operation Grapple shaped
colonial rule by offering new resources to support a large-scale population increase.
However, much of this was temporary, which is emblematic of how the Colonial
Office, the Ministry of Supply, and the British government viewed the nuclear
experiments: as a short-term issue.
Britain needed to update its nuclear arsenal to remain relevant on the global
stage. Their nuclear technology was considered outdated by the late 1950s, 117 which
meant that Britain was on the verge of losing its geopolitical influence and ran the risk
of falling behind in the developing Cold War. The need to act quickly led to a myopic
approach to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the early stages of Operation Grapple,
which is perhaps why there was much confusion over who exactly was in charge of
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administering the colony. The British government did not necessarily envision a longterm military base until the later stages of the nuclear experiments. Infrastructure may
have been put in place, but it was for the military and success of the nuclear
experiments, rather than developing the colony in the long run. It was the attention on
the military which led to the basis for colonisation shifting in the post-war era.
The Military Colony
Operation Grapple also changed the basis for the continued possession of the
Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony. The British had upgraded the status of the colony
from that of protectorate to Crown Colony in 1892 partly due to growing German
influence in the region but also because it proved to be economically valuable with the
copra trade. 118 This remained the case until the arrival of the Grapple Task Force in
the 1950s. When the first wave of Grapple tests was over, the acting High
Commissioner of the Western Pacific noted that the continuation of experiments would
cause “dislocation of the colony’s economy and serious loss of revenue”, with the
Copra trade having an estimated value of £30,000 at the time. 119 Although this
telegram was addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, it was also
distributed directly to the treasury, which was unusual for correspondence regarding
Operation Grapple. The acting High Commissioner was perhaps trying to persuade the
central government that the experiments would make the colony unsustainable in
regard to their original purpose.
In a different telegram, the new High Commissioner also noted that the
colony’s resources were unable to provide for the expected influx of soldiers. 120 The
High Commissioner may have been threatened by the power balance shifting toward
the Ministry of Supply and be trying to remind the central government of the reason
for colonising the region in the first place. However, a change Operation Grapple
brought to the colony was the basis for colonising the islands. The function of the
colony changed from providing the British government with a small income to
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becoming a centre for scientific excellence. The experiments went ahead despite the
economic dislocation it would eventually cause. The change of the basis for continuing
colonisation led to the transfer of power from the commissioners to the Ministry of
Supply. Once the rationale for proceeding with the colonisation of the islands became
keeping them for the sake of military experiments, it only made sense that the military
itself was given the power to preside over the colony. Therefore, Operation Grapple
not only shaped the way the colony was administered but the very basis for claiming
ownership of the islands in the post-war era.
Once the final round of experiments had finished, the future of nuclear
technology as well as the future of the islands themselves also hanged in the balance.
As whether any further experiments would take place remained ambiguous, the
Colonial Office wanted the basis for continuing British sovereignty in the colony to
return to an economic one, as it had been prior to the Second World War. 121 However,
the military was not as keen to relinquish control so soon. As the prospect of
experiments beyond Grapple Z were likely, a garrison was to remain on the island until
further notice. 122 Therefore, the end of Operation Grapple did not mark an end of a
military presence on the islands.
Since Japanese expansion during the Second World War, the islands had seen
a continuous military presence, albeit from different countries. The prospect of using
the islands as a test site in the future, meant that there was justification for the British
military to maintain a strong presence into the 1960s. In a letter in January 1959, the
Ministry of Supply outlined different states of activity on the island going forward.
The plan outlined is one of military presence correlating to the level of nuclear activity
in the future. As the military presence lessoned, the plan was for the economic
infrastructure to become more prominent in the running of the colony. 123 Therefore,
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the future of the colony appeared to be one that merged the pre- and post-war
underpinnings of the sustaining colonial status. The blending of an economic and
military base is perhaps emblematic of the political climate of the time. The need for
a strong economy and technological parity were key for superpower status in the postwar world. Ultimately, the British government wanted to sustain this, and the former
colonial backwater may have represented a possible future for this. Moreover, this new
proposal suggests that neither department in the government envisioned decolonising
the region as long as it was both economically viable and a place to test nuclear
weapons when needed. Therefore, Operation Grapple shaped the future of colonial
rule in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands to one of continued British presence, whether
colonial, military, or a mixture of the two whenever required.
However, it is also worth taking view the administration from a global
perspective. In 1942, the Japanese annexed the islands and administered by the military
until the American military liberated the islands during their ‘Island Hopping’
campaign. 124 Due to the ongoing war during Japanese annexation, the islands became
strategic as they could prevent foreign powers from reaching the mainland. The
Japanese military, therefore, was left in charge of administering the islands as part of
the war effort. 125 This was perhaps the beginning of military rule on the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands. Once liberated by the United States, many of the islanders received the
Americans well, and saw their rule as an improvement as new roads, buildings and
airstrips were built, which aided economic recovery after the war.
It remained unclear who precisely had sovereignty for some time following the
war, 126 the British government’s readiness to use Christmas and Malden Island
suggests that they reassumed they had sovereignty over the islands at some point.
Consequently, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands had a continuous, foreign military
presence for over a decade before the Grapple Task Force arrived. Therefore,
Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule by providing a new form of rule, but this was
nothing new to the Gilbertese people. The transfer of power to the military was only a
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change on the part of the British. The mindset of the British government may have
shifted toward, what Edgerton refer to, the ‘warfare state’: one where all branches of
the military grew, and the British state grew dependent on the military in turn. 127
Operation Grapple was ultimately an extension of this as it was not only the British
state which relied more on the military but far-reaching colonies as well. Therefore,
colonial rule of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands was transformed by the nuclear
experiments as the mindset of those in London became more focused on the military.
The shift toward military administration of the islands was far from anything new for
the Gilbertese, but it was for their colonial rulers.
However, this shift did not come without its problems. The transition of power
from the Colonial Office to the Ministry of Supply caused an uneasy relationship
between the two, with tensions coming from two fronts: concerns for the environment
and the exchange of information. Environmental concerns were raised in letter from
the 18th September 1957, D. J. Derx, noted that the main concerns of the Colonial
Office regarding Operation Grapple were to ensure the safety of the inhabitants and to
protect the economic interests. 128 In the same letter, Derx noted that the nuclear
experiments would interfere with the pre-existing plantations. The building and
maintenance of military bases would require the land to be used for other purposes as
well as the radioactive fallout contaminating the produce. The continuation of
Operation Grapple threatened to disrupt the original reason for possession of the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands. These concerns were raised at a planning meeting on the 8th
January the following year but were put aside as the development of a nuclear bomb
had to take precedent. 129 Tensions soon arose within Whitehall.
The reason for continued colonisation was unclear during the transition from
an economic basis to a scientific one. A compromise was made, as daily checks of the
fish and water quality across the Pacific, albeit administered by the Atomic Weapons
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Research Establishment, starting in Fiji. 130 The notification was sent by the Secretary
of State of the Colonies, suggesting that his role was an intermediary between those in
control of the experiments, the military, and those administering them: the
commissioners present in the Pacific. The Colonial Office had little say when it came
to administering the checks on the quality of water and fish. All this marked a new,
uneasy relationship within the various governmental departments. The Commissioners
and the Colonial Office were becoming subordinate with the arrival of nuclear
technology, which is perhaps why they asserted the original purpose of having the
colony in September of 1957 and asking for provisions to be made in the January of
1958. Therefore, with Operation Grapple changing the rationale for ongoing
colonisation, an uneasy relationship between the Colonial Office and the Ministry of
Supply was forged.
Furthermore, the tensions between the two departments owed as much to the
exchange of information as to the confusion over what the purpose of the colony was.
It was noted that Grapple X was planned in haste, meaning that different people were
left out of the loop, 131 perhaps due to an oversight. This role of the colonial
administrators was not just dwarfed in the sense of their role becoming increasingly
more redundant, but they were left out of the planning entirely. In a letter from the 18th
October 1957 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the acting High Commissioner
of the Western Pacific expressed his frustration of being ignored when it came to the
exchange of information by ending his letter expressing his desire “to learn urgently
what announcement has been made” in regard to the developments of the hydrogen
bomb tests. 132 Also, when it came to official planning meetings, the Colonial Office
also had significantly less representation than the other governmental departments,
especially the branches of the military who chaired them. 133 The underrepresentation
130
‘Telegram from the Fijian Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11th January 1958’,
Colonial and Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC
Series), National Archives, London, CO1036/283, f.70
131
‘Draft Telegraph from the Colonial Office to the Ministry of Defence, 6th September 1957’, Colonial
and Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC Series),
National Archives, London, CO1036/282, f.34
132
‘Telegram from the Acting High Commissioner of the Western Pacific to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, 18th October 1957’ Colonial and Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean
Department: Registered Files (PAC Series), National Archives, London, CO1036/283, f.167
133
‘Minutes from Meeting held at St. Giles Court on 11th September 1957’ Colonial and Commonwealth
Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC Series), National Archives,
London, CO1036/283, f.238

50

of the Colonial Office was symbolic of how the Gilbert and Ellice islands were
transformed by Operation Grapple from a colonial backwater, providing the metropole
with a modest income, to a military playground where they could do as they pleased.
The commissioners may have been left out of the loop because they were not
considered by the Ministry of Supply when it came to the exchange of information.
The military saw the commissioners as simply administrators with no real power
anymore. Therefore, a new relationship emerged as the military did not just have a
monopoly on the running of the colony but the exchange of information regarding
Britain’s nuclear weapons programme. This dramatic change in the space of a few
years led to an uneasy relationship as the Commissioners’ roles were dwarfed and this
exacerbation was expressed. Ultimately, the nuclear tests shaped colonial rule in the
region by casting doubt onto who was responsible for issues beyond the development
of a hydrogen bomb.
However, this was not the case for the military personnel. Although little has
been written about the Gilbertese and their relationship with their metropolitan rulers
during this experiment, the Fijian soldiers were regarded as integrating well with their
British counterparts. In a memorandum sent by the Grapple Task Force concerning
Fijian employees, it was remarked that they were “completely integrated with the UK
forces at Christmas” island. 134 This sentiment was held by the Fijian soldiers
themselves. When speaking in the 1990s, Ratu Inoke Bainimara recalled a sense of
community and that the different groups “socialised well” and “it seemed as if [they]
all knew each other before meeting”. 135 Operation Grapple may have caused confusion
and a communication breakdown between commissioners and governmental
departments, but it opened up communication between colonial rulers and subjects in
a way which had never happened before. Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule not
only led to a military basis for continuing colonisation but integrated different armed
forces which had little contact prior to the nuclear experiments. Previous boundaries
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that separated the British from their colonial subjects may have lessened in this new
era of colonialism. Pacific Islanders may have become less of an ‘other’ as long as
they were of service to the military.
Boundaries may have been erected between the different administrative
departments during the transition toward the new military colony, but this did not
necessarily apply to all levels of people present on Christmas Island. The differences
between British and Fijian perhaps mattered less than in previous decades as they were
both useful in ensuring the success of the development of a nuclear arsenal. Therefore,
Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule in the region by removing the ‘otherization’
which had characterised British imperialism as long as the relevant subjects were
useful to the military.
However, these boundaries were not entirely removed. There was still a
preference toward those who spoke English from the colonial elites. When discussing
the use of Fijian soldiers to help carry out Operation Grapple, it was decided that “some
form of proficiency allowance […] should be paid to those with a knowledge of
English” in a planning meeting on the 25th March 1957. 136 Fluency in the English
language may have been preferential to ensure that the experiments ran smoothly, but
monetary compensation also implemented an incentive for Fijians with a more basic
grasp of the language to improve. Spreading the English language has long been a
major part of British imperialism, and with Operation Grapple, this mindset had firmly
reached Fiji. Although in this instance, it was done through financial incentives rather
than through coercion. Operation Grapple may have changed colonial rule in the
region by changing the basis for continuing colonisation with a military rather than
economic rationale, but the emphasis on the English language marked a sense of
continuity. Communication between the metropole and the colony was key in ensuring
that British power remained strong for the remainder of the 20th century. Ensuring that
the subjects would remain speaking English on whilst part of the military complex was
perhaps a way of ensuring colonial longevity.
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Operation Grapple ultimately shaped colonial rule by altering what defined
British colonialism. The military became the new base because that was a way of
maintaining power on the global stage in the post-war era. Other than a strong
economy, the superpowers of the day possessed knowledge of advanced weaponry
which kept the balance of power in place. A strong military complex became key in
ensuring power in the 1950s and beyond. The transition from an economic base to a
military one was, therefore, vital, which meant that the dominance of the English
language was also key in this new era as it ensured a successful military operation.
The Pacific Empire
Issues pertaining the development of a hydrogen bomb also extended to the
collection of scientific data across Oceania. Much like with the Gilbert and Ellice
Islands, the British government had little interest in their other claims in the Pacific,
outside of Australia and New Zealand. Many of the smaller colonial possessions were
administered by the Australian and New Zealand governments. 137 However, the
changes to the level of interest in the Pacific did not end with the changes seen on
Christmas and Malden Islands. Interest was also expressed in Fanning Island, which
is also part of the Line Islands. On the 22nd August 1957, Vice Air Marshall Oulton
asked the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and the Ministry of supply for permission to
build bases with Decca stations on other islands across the Pacific, starting with
Fanning Island. 138 Oulton was the head of the Task Force for the later Grapple
experiments. Although he had little vested interest in colonial affairs, he wanted to
persuade the relevant departments to leverage their power to allow for more data to be
collected from the radioactive fallout from the experiments. He was successful as the
Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs soon granted this. 139 Such plans also extended
to Fiji, with similar equipment being based there from mid-October of 1957. 140 With
the use of a second colony in Melanesia, Operation Grapple became a Pan-Pacific
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programme. Fiji was perhaps no longer considered to be a separate entity, but part of
the same system of Pacific colonies that could be utilised to achieve the megaton
mission. Therefore, Operation Grapple did not only usher in new metropolitan interests
of the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony but the Pacific as a region. British Colonial
rule was transformed in the region as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands became the
epicentre as what has been described as the ‘nuclear playground’. The activities there
managed to elevate the islands to the status of becoming the centre for British activities
in the region.
However, British geopolitical power was not without its limits. Afterall, the
British still had to negotiate with the Australian and New Zealand governments to win
over their continued support. Both Australia and New Zealand were independent by
the late 1950s, but they still had close ties with Britain due to their alliance during the
Second World War and the dominion status they enjoyed.
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Commonwealth Relations Office had to balance the public opinions of these countries
with the British government’s desire for a substantial nuclear arsenal. A letter from the
Prime Minister’s office noted that communication with the governments regarding
Operation Grapple would only be done “if it becomes necessary”.
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correspondence eventually came when the Commonwealth Relations Office requested
the same level of support in Operation Grapple as they saw in the Maralinga
experiments. 143 However, they also request that their plans are kept secret from the
Australian public unless it became necessary in the same letter. 144 In a different
telegram, from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the U.K. High Commissioners
in Australia and New Zealand, the increasing unpopularity of nuclear weaponry within
Australian and New Zealand society was also noted. 145 This marked a change in the
relationship between the governments of the three countries. Whereas with the
W. D. McIntyre, Winging Up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands, (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p.12
‘Draft Letter from Grapple Task Force to Aubrey Jones, Ministry of Finance, 22nd June 1957’,
Colonial and Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC
Series), National Archives, London, CO1036/282, f.190
143
‘Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Australia, 27th
July 1957’, Colonial and Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered
Files (PAC Series), National Archives, London, CO1036/282, f.151
144
Ibid
145
‘Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Australia and
UK High Commissioner in New Zealand, 27th July 1957’, Colonial and Commonwealth Office: Pacific
and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC Series), National Archives, London, CO1036/282,
f.152
141
142

54

Maralinga experiments, the British government were able to carry on with less
consideration of balancing public opinion, in comparison to asking for support for the
tests on Christmas Island.
Operation Grapple quickly became a Pan-Pacific operation. It required
cooperation with both present and former colonies alike. Perhaps the megaton mission
managed to transcend colonial and post-colonial boundaries as Britain had to garner
support from across the Pacific in order to achieve their goal. The level of negotiation
may have been different, but there is a commonality. Britain used its influence in the
region to make sure that Operation Grapple was a success. Therefore, Operation
Grapple managed to change the nature of colonial rule in the region by both piquing
interest in the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony as well as providing a platform for
Britain to exert its influence in Oceania when needed.
Yet, the exertion of British influence in Oceania also went beyond the
established colonial and post-colonial boundaries as American territories also became
a key part in the British nuclear playground. With the McMahon Act of 1946, the
exchange of information was severely restricted as gave the government complete
control on the exchange of information as well as putting an end to international
cooperation. 146 The relationship between the two powers became strained as the
British access to this scientific knowledge was stopped. This had ramifications lasting
over a decade. In a report produced for the director of Operation Grapple, it was noted
that information given to American authorities was on a need-to-know basis and that
security measures were to remain strict when it came to allowing American ships
access to the islands and the region surrounding them. 147 The trust between the two
nations was unsustainable, as those organising the experiments were as unwilling as
their American counterparts to exchange information.
Moreover, their relationship remained complex with the territorial boundaries
becoming blurred. In a report from 20th September 1957, it was suggested that
equipment to monitor the radioactive fallout of the nuclear tests would be positioned
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on Samoa and Hawaii, American territories, before consulting Washington about
this. 148 The territorial lines may have become blurred as the organisation committee
felt entitled to station equipment on American soil as measuring radioactive fallout
took priority. Darwin has outlined four types of imperialism that Britain engaged in
and this is perhaps an example of the final form: where Britain used shrewd diplomacy
and investment to exert a more informal form of influence. 149 The British government
was exploiting American desire for their close ally to have a functioning weapon to
extend their influence in the Pacific Islands. Therefore, Operation Grapple complicated
the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. The British military was unwilling to share
information regarding their experiments with the United States, one of their closest
allies, yet wanted to test the fallout of their experiments on American territorial
possessions. Therefore, Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule in the South Pacific as
it not only blurred the lines between colonial and post-colonial boundaries but
managed to transcend them both. As nuclear weaponry had such an important role in
the post-war era, the importance of sovereignty of the islands shrank as the nuclear
arms race continued. Operation Grapple provided a means for the British to exert
influence not only on other their own colonies, and former colonies, but on American
territories also. Ultimately, this perhaps marked a new era of colonial rule, with the
military administering the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and the islands themselves
becoming the centre of British influence within the region.
This influence could be seen when the British government had to negotiate
with the Fijian government about using their forces in Operation Grapple. The
Ministry of Supply did not have the authority to demand Fijian cooperation but instead
had to enter a series of negotiations to ensure this. This involved incentivising the
Fijian governor. On the 5th September 1958, the Sectary of State for the Colonies send
a telegram suggesting that pensions would be given to the Fijian soldiers who partook
in Operation Grapple. 150 The minutes from a planning meeting on the 26th January the
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following year, urged that the Ministry of Supply “take up any queries with Fiji”
directly. 151 The planning committee for the experiments, which included the Colonial
and Foreign Offices, saw Fiji as a distinct entity to be negotiated with rather than a
colony which could be utilised as and when required. Operation Grapple may have
influenced colonial rule in Oceania more generally by creating more fluid boundaries
between separate colonies, even ones possessed by a different country, but it did not
remove these boundaries entirely.
The development of a nuclear bomb took precedence over sovereignty of
individual islands, and how they were governed prior to the Second World War.
However, this still required a great degree of international cooperation. Fiji itself was
still a British colony, but the 1950s saw a wave of colonies wanting greater autonomy,
and even independence. Perhaps the British government were cautious of Fiji wanting
this, and no longer being firmly under British control. Therefore, negotiations were a
part of ensuring Fijian cooperation, who were seen as a separate entity to the Gilbert
and Ellice Islands. Therefore, Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule in the Sothern
Pacific by dissolving but not removing colonial boundaries. Fijian soldiers were still
regarded as a resource to be utilised, but the Fijian governor was still someone that
needed to persuade to allow access to said resources.
Moreover, it is worth considering the Gilbertese population as well. Afterall,
the envisioned future of the region had implications for them. The Colonial Office
recognised the imposition that constant evacuation would have on those that called the
island home. The Colonial Office also raised concerns over the health and wellbeing
of the islanders and the state of their homes being so close to the blast. 152 More
thorough health checks were preferred by the department to ensure that there were no
long-lasting damages to the colonial subjects, which would have also been useful to
knowing the potential impact hydrogen bombs could have had in the event of a nuclear
war. It is worth noting that the Colonial Office, rather than the Ministry of Supply,
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raised these concerns Perhaps due to their long-standing involvement with Gilbertese
population, there was a greater culture of paternalism than with the military, who were
more concerned with keeping up in the nuclear arms race. The Colonial Office wanted
to ensure that the colonial subjects remained healthy and able to remain part of the
nuclear experiments. Unlike their Fijian counterparts, whose support was assured
through a period of negotiation, the Gilbert and Ellice Island commissioner was open
to the increased presence of Fijian soldiers as long as the native population were not
completely pushed aside.

153

Also, concerns for their role on the island in the long-term were discussed and
the decision to increase the Gilbertese labour force was made in the hopes of increasing
their autonomy. 154 Their duties included the maintenance of the military bases as well
as assisting in copra and food production to ensure a sustainable economy. 155 This has
mutual benefits as it meant less labour required from elsewhere in the Pacific as well
as giving the Gilbertese more employment opportunities. However, it meant
continuously being moved around and subordinate to the metropole whilst the
indigenous role on the islands was being decided. Whether being moved to test the
weapons or working to sustain the military infrastructure and colonial economy, the
Gilbertese were still firmly part of the Empire into the 1960s. Rather than seeing an
increased autonomy like other parts of the British world system. Therefore, the future
of the Gilbertese population was that of continued subordination. Much like the islands
they inhabited, they were envisioned to remain part of the Empire with their use
depending on what the orders from London were. Despite the change from migrants
to labourers in the second half of the 1950s, there was little change in seeing the
Gilbertese as much more than a resource to serve the larger colonial enterprise.
Therefore, when it came to envisioning how the 1960s would pan out for the Gilbert
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and Ellice Islands, one of being the centre of military control extending to the rest of
the continent offered little for the indigenous population. Operation Grapple
transformed the way the colony was perceived and administered, but there was a sense
of continuity for the local population who were expected to remain subordinate to the
British Empire, regardless of what form this took in the 1960s and beyond.
Overall, it is worth considering the larger context of decolonisation. It is largely
assumed that the 1950s ushered in what has been called the ‘East of Suez’ movement.
This was where the British government engaged in a series of negotiations to
relinquish strategic outposts and withdraw troops in colonies East of the Suez Canal.156
However, Operation Grapple demonstrates that this is a rather simplistic way of
approaching the issue of British imperialism in the post-war era. Operation Grapple
occurred simultaneously with the decolonisation process of Africa. Yet, it is clear the
government had no intention of letting the South Pacific colonies, in particular the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands gain independence as long as they were needed for the
development of nuclear weaponry. Coupled with the colony not being a viable option
for independence, meant decolonisation for the islands was out of the question. The
post-war decolonisation movements that were in full swing by the late 1950s meant
that Britain could no longer rely on vast territories with plenty of resources to utilise
in the event of another large-scale war and sophisticated weapons became a necessity
in defending Britain both home and abroad.
In 1968, Australian leader of the opposition Gough Whitlam criticised the
British government for their lack of commitment to decolonisation, declaring that the
East of Suez movement was not a ‘West of Panama’ movement as well. 157 Whitlam
was frustrated that the Australian government had essentially taken over governance
of the South Pacific colonies after the test-ban treaty was passed in 1963. When
considering Operation Grapple, perhaps Whitlam was correct that the East of Suez
movement did not extend as eastward as the name suggests. There was little desire for
independence in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in the South
Pacific, which was perhaps why the British government saw the region as being fair
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game for the nuclear experiments. Instead of transforming British influence toward
incorporation into the Commonwealth, Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule by
introducing military rule to the South Pacific and created a different system entirely.
The Gilbert and Ellice Islands were to remain part of the British world system but as
the temporary centre for the Pacific Empire under military control. Operation Grapple
represented the limitations of the East of Suez movement as well as the development
of a new form of imperialism in the South Pacific.
Conclusion
Operation Grapple had a profound impact on colonial rule in the Gilbert and
Ellice Island colony as well as the South Pacific more generally. With the declining
Empire, the justification for continuing to claim sovereignty on the islands on purely
economic grounds became questionable at the beginning of the 1950s. The small and
remote nature of the islands meant that they would have not been able to sustain
themselves as sovereign nations, meaning they were not considered a viable candidate
for independence by the British government either. However, as the nuclear arms race
developed, the British government became engulfed in keeping up to date with the
latest developments of such technology, meaning the islands gained a new purpose: to
act as the focal point for the British ‘nuclear playground’. Although temporary, the
financial, and later administrative, responsibility was soon transferred away from the
Colonial Office toward the Ministry of Supply. Afterall, Operation Grapple fell within
the portfolio of the Ministry of Supply. This brought with it tensions, as issues
regarding the environment and the exchange of information meant this process was
not as smooth as would have been ideal for conducting scientific experiments. The link
between technological development and the administration of the region between
where experiments took place became more explicit. The two departments were unable
to have a clear hierarchy which would have been commonplace prior to the war, which
led to the Colonial Office having less of a say in matters pertaining to this specific
colony. Tensions arose when issues which the Colonial Office would have previously
presided over were encroached on by the military. Therefore, the staff at the Colonial
Office may have felt insecure as they could see the end of their role was in sight.
With the decolonisation of various colonies across the globe, and the remaining
colonies in the South Pacific becoming under the role of the military, the need and
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significance of the Colonial Office shrank. Operation Grapple shaped colonial rule in
the region by signifying a new era for Britain on the global stage. Nonetheless, the
rationale for continuing colonising the region became a military and scientific one,
marking a change on the part of the British. Yet, this was not necessarily a grand
departure from how the islands had been administered since Japanese annexation in
1942. The move toward military rule was a change on the part of the British as the
desire for a hydrogen bomb helped shift their mindset toward a militaristic one. The
continuity of British rule for the Gilbertese islanders was expected to last long after
the end of Grapple Z. Lives of continued military rule and subordination to the
metropole were to persist. As long as the islands were useful in being part of the British
‘nuclear playground’ then the military was going to stay. Although the basis for
colonisation continued there were features that persisted. Most notably, the
subordination of Pacific Islanders and a preference for those who would assimilate into
the imperial system, as seen through the financial incentive for the Fijian soldiers who
could speak proficient English or were willing to improve their knowledge of the
language. Therefore, the ethnic demographics may have dramatically changed in the
late 1950s, but little changed for those living on the islands in terms of the pre-existing
colonial structures.
Furthermore, Operation Grapple did not just end with the Gilbert and Ellice
Islands. For the experiments to be a success, cooperation from the two dominions in
Oceania was required, as well as labour and monitoring stations across the Pacific. The
nuclear experiments helped change transform the colony into a focal point for the
British Empire in the South Pacific, albeit temporarily.
The nuclear bomb transcended colonial boundaries and made them more fluid.
The success of the megaton mission rested on it being a Pan-Pacific operation, which
meant that boundaries between the islands had to become less rigid. However, these
boundaries did not completely disappear as negotiations still had to take place, as seen
with the Fijian governor and the colony’s military. This fluidity also extended to
boundaries with other nations’ possessions. Despite what can be described as a tense
relationship with the United States, Operation Grapple superseded this as the
development of a megaton bomb was more important. Therefore, Operation Grapple
did not only change colonial rule, but how the region was administered. Overall,
Operation Grapple saw a new era for the South Pacific. Prior to the Second World War,
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the boundaries between colonies, particularly those administered by different countries,
would have been the basis for how each individual colony was organised. A new era
was ushered in with the nuclear bomb as their development was more important than
the colonies used to test them. The success of the megaton mission was important for
the United States as it offered a chance to skew the balance of power toward the west
and the Gilbert and Ellice islands were at the centre of this success both physically and
symbolically. Ultimately, the South Pacific became the ‘nuclear playground’ for the
British and Americans in the 1950s and the possession of a hydrogen bomb was more
important than colonial boundaries in Oceania in the post-war era. Yet, Operation
Grapple affected Britain’s place in the world beyond changes to colonial rule and the
government’s vision for the Pacific in the 1960s. It is important to consider how Britain
related to other nations within the new context of developing a nuclear arsenal.

62

Chapter III

63

Introduction
When examining the relationship between Operation Grapple and Britain’s
place in the world, it is important to look at how Britain related to other countries. This
will make it easier to gauge how the British government viewed themselves, and the
sort of power they were exerting. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first
looks at Anglo-French relations and how Britain was initially wary of French interests
but still relied on them for help when it came to manning bases to measure the
radioactive fallout. The United States was also frequently mentioned in the
correspondence of planning the Grapple series. The two powers had to work around
the restrictive McMahon Act, which was passed in the aftermath of the Second World
War and halted international cooperation on the development of nuclear technology. 158
This set the tone of the relationship between Britain and America as they had to work
around this piece of legislation as the two wanted to help each other with resources
and scientific knowledge. This demonstrates the more subtle mean of exerting power
Britain used in the late 1950s. They had to use methods such as witnessing tests and
using bases to get around the secrecy that had become a hindrance at the height of the
Cold War. These subtler means were also useful when dealing with the dominions of
the South Pacific: Australia and New Zealand. Both countries had become increasingly
distant from Britain since the end of the Second World War. 159 Yet, with the transition
from formal Empire toward the Commonwealth, Britain was keen to keep these two
former colonies on side as it would strengthen this newer structure. Both Australia and
New Zealand were needed to supply resources but were hesitant as nuclear weaponry
was a contentious political issue of the day. Instead of making demands, the British
government persuaded Australia to view the experiments as being a continuity of those
in Maralinga, South Australia, at the beginning of the decade as well as offering the
chance for those with Dominion passports to visit the islands and witness the final
rounds of experiments. Britain was in a position where it was more effective to
negotiate and persuade rather than dictate.
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Though, as discussed in the previous chapters, there were plenty of other
colonies, both former and otherwise, in the South Pacific. Correspondence between
Fiji and Britain was frequent as they were the colony which was supplying the most to
the experiments primarily with manpower. However, the British government and the
Grapple Task Force had to persuade the Fijian governor to send a workforce, rather
than demanding it of him, despite Fiji still being a Crown Colony in the late 1950s.
This primarily took place with the promise of a cashflow into the colony though a
pension scheme and the ability to claim expenses. Britain was not only softly exerting
power with more powerful countries like the United States, but this approach extended
downward toward the remote colonies. To contrast this, was the disregard of Japan,
where there were frequent protests against Operation Grapple, and appeared to have
the backing of the Japanese government, at least in the eyes of those back at Whitehall.
The reasons for the protests - fears of nuclear explosions, the proximity of the Japanese
Islands, and the disruption to the fishing industry in the region - were ignored but
handled delicately through careful diplomacy. Overall, a functioning hydrogen bomb
was the key to maintaining a strong position on the global stage.
On the run up to succeeding in this, Britain was arguably still in strong position
as it managed to keep the upper hand in most of these negotiations, although less so
with the United States. Yet, the power exerted was far from harsh and dictatorial.
British power during this period was soft. A paradox ultimately arose with soft power
being exerted through military action. Instead of making demands, diplomacy was
based more on a sense of give and take, with benefits being offered to the country
being dealt with. This would have been beneficial when the British government were
looking at the remainder of the 20th century as formal methods of imperialism Britain
relied on prior to World War Two were being transformed into the Commonwealth
system. This reflects other systems of negotiation, such as NATO or European bodies,
where symbiotic relationships were more beneficial to keeping them harmonious.
Overall, Britain was still in a position where they could exert power, but the power
itself was soft and relied on a system of give and take, which stood in contrast to the
harsh nature of nuclear weapons.
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France
Anglo-French relations have a long and complex history, and the Cold War did
not simplify things. During the Second World War, the two nations were allies and
this cordial aspect of the relationship sustained into the post-war era but during the
1950s, this was starting to wear thin. 160 Despite theoretically being on the same side
of the Iron Curtain, throughout Operation Grapple, the British government were often
wary of French interests. In a telegram from the 4th August 1957 the acting High
Commissioner of the Western Pacific expressed wariness over French interest in Flint
Island. He requested the chance to consult the Resident Commissioner over the
issue. 161 The British entry into the nuclear arms race piqued French interests, as by
1957, they were considering developing such technology themselves. However, the
secretive nature of the arms race meant that the British were unable to fully trust their
allies, including the French. On the 31st January 1957, the Foreign Office informed the
French authorities in Papeete, French Polynesia, that their request to enter the islands
and their surrounding water was denied with no possibility of this permission being
granted in the future. 162 The Foreign Office and the commissioners on the ground
perhaps felt that they were unable to fully trust the French with their nuclear secrets.
Therefore, Anglo-French relations could be described as frosty as their alliance which
was prominent during the Second World War was not strong enough to allow for the
exchange of information. Branches of the British government wanted to keep the
French at arm’s length.
However, this is far from the entire picture. The French were still present in
the South Pacific, with French Polynesia being integral from the transition from formal
imperialism to the system of overseas territories familiar with the republic today.163
French Polynesia was of use to the British as the British scientists needed to monitor
the radioactive fallout of the nuclear weaponry across a variety of different locations.
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Although the British may have kept the French from knowing all of their nuclear
secrets, but the French government was supportive of the British in their endeavours.
In a telegram from January 1957, the Foreign Office commended the Parisian
government for their support in allowing equipment to be stationed in French
Polynesia. 164 This may have been down to the monitoring station providing the French
scientists with an insight into the nature and success of the experiments at Christmas
Island. After all, the French trials were within five years. 165
Yet, it could have been due to allegiance in the Cold War, as the British nuclear
programme worked in favour of the French. The British bomb provided a balancing
force in Europe against the threat of the Soviet bomb, they were not entirely dependent
on the United States. 166 The relationship between the two European powers was not
entirely frosty, but one of convenience as well. Both sides used each other to achieve
what they needed at that moment. Perhaps this is the nature of allegiances in the Cold
War, not one of altruism but one of convenience to stop the spread of communism and
protect the interests of Western Europe. Therefore, Anglo-French relations cannot
necessarily be described as extremely close but one where the other side could use
each other to maintain the balance of power and interests in Europe.
Moreover, some other groups involved with Operation Grapple were keener on
sustaining contact with their French counterparts than others. The Foreign Office may
not have fully trusted the French to be involved with their South Pacific experiments,
but this did not extend to everyone involved. The two nations were still on the same
side in the divided world, and to advance nuclear weaponry in a limited timeframe
relied on international cooperation, hence the monitoring stations on islands outside of
British sovereignty. Lovelock, of the Ministry of Supply realised this. In a letter he
wrote to Brown, of the Foreign Office on the 1st February 1957, he acknowledged that
formal contact was not permitted but noted that there was a level of collaboration
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between the scientists in the Pacific. 167 The extent of the communication that took
place remains unknown but there was still informal contact, nonetheless. Therefore,
the frosty relationship which can be inferred from the denial of entry is a rather limited
view and what allegiances meant during the Cold War depended on what a particular
role was. For the Foreign Office, the French were to remain at arm’s length, only useful
when it came to positioning monitoring and scientific equipment. However, for those
scientists, French input may have been important as they were under pressure to swiftly
advance the nuclear arsenal. The French were useful for handing monitoring
equipment and were held in high enough esteem for regular, informal contact but this
was not extended to government officials as the bond was not strong enough for a
thorough exchange of information about anything specific. When it comes to
examining Britain’s place in the world in the late 1950s, their approach to the French
is rather insightful. There was a clear hierarchy of NATO allies. The French were not
as useful as the Americans or those of Dominion status, and were therefore, not privy
to closely guarded nuclear secrets. The British were able to use the French for their
own ends whilst doing this, suggesting they still had the upper hand over the French
in the Cold War. They may have been allies, but the British were still able to maintain
the upper hand.
United States
When looking at the Cold War, it is difficult to ignore Britain’s most important
ally: The United States. The two nations had been allies and involved in the other’s
affairs long before Operation Grapple came around. Their ‘special relationship’ was
perhaps best demonstrated when the issue of island sovereignty came up. During the
Second World War, the American army liberated the Gilbert and Ellice Islands from
Japanese control. The issue of sovereignty of a small and remote colony was not a
pressing issue in the resolution of the war, meaning that it had not come up until the
late 1950s. In a telegram from the 3rd September 1957, the Colonial Office informed
the Treasury and the Foreign Office that “The United States is again being kept
informed of our intentions in regard to Christmas Island as to avoid any trouble over
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the issue of sovereignty”. 168 There was a clear trade-off for the British to achieve their
goals. Strong Anglo-American relations were based on a mixture of mutual interests
as well as negotiations.
The Colonial Office was aware that American support was not entirely
unconditional and relied on a balance of give and take. The British government was
keen on keeping their American allies in the loop with the experiments to avoid
Washington taking a hard stance on the issue of island sovereignty. In order to buy
American silence on the issue, some precious nuclear secrets, which were not available
to other nations, had to be shared. It is also worth noting that the advancement of
British nuclear weaponry worked in favour of the Americans at the height of the Cold
War as it could help even out the balance of powers with the Soviet Union, as well as
helping to provide a safeguard in Europe. Therefore, Anglo-American relations may
have been strong but there was an element of give and take. For the issue of sovereignty
not to be raised, the Americans were partially let in on the British nuclear secret.
Although the two nations had been bound together during the initial stages of
the Cold War, they still were motivated by their own interests. Burk argued that the
‘special relationship’ between the two powers became strained during the Cold War
and the McMahon Act marked a change in the balance of power as the American
government were prioritising their own national interests over helping their old ally.169
However, this cut both ways as the British government was firm that, as far as they
were concerned, their security interests took precedent over American economics. In
a letter from the Department of State in Washington on the 7th January 1957 to the
Foreign Office, the American government noted that Operation Grapple may lead to
“considerable financial loss” as South Pacific Air Lines would not be able to operate
in the capacity it had become accustomed to. However, the same letter noted their
respect of the “overriding military necessity of conducting the tests”. 170 The end goal
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of advanced nuclear technology was a shared goal by the two nations, which is why
the American government was willing to take the limited financial hit in this pursuit.
The Cold War may have led to fluid boundaries between islands in the South
Pacific (see Chapter II) and intertwined the national interests of the United Kingdom
and the United States, the two nations still remained separate entities. The British
government still had to put its own national interests before other nations. Therefore,
Anglo-American relations can still be seen as strong as the Americans were willing to
step aside for the greater good of a strong nuclear arsenal. Though, the strength of the
‘special relationship’ rested on the two nations goal’s being aligned. Like with the
issue of island sovereignty, Britain having a strong nuclear arsenal worked in favour
of the United States, meaning that comparatively less important issues were not as high
a priority. The strength of the ‘special relationship’ was based less on altruism, than
on shared interests and values. The two nations had to negotiate the hierarchy of their
interests so that issues such as island sovereignty and minor economic hits would not
cause any friction during an era of high tensions, such as the Cold War.
Despite minor issues being raised, the Americans were not put out by this. In a
telegram from the 19th December 1957 the Foreign Office thanked their counterparts
in Washington for their continuous support in taking samples from the radioactive
fallout. 171 Fuelled by early Cold War paranoia, the McMahon Act 1946 prevented the
exchange of information regarding nuclear weaponry, which prevented the two nations
from working closely together, as was the case with the Manhattan Project. 172 The
minutes from a meeting held on the 4th December of the same year also noted that there
were plans for an additional staging post at Florida for transporting goods and
resources from the UK to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. 173 The British government
could rely on the United States for support in Operation Grapple, as they were willing
to work around the McMahon Act wherever possible. The issues of island sovereignty
and economic impacts were put aside and the United States were willing to assist in
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the transportation of goods and measuring of radioactive equipment which shows how
impractical the McMahon Act had become by the late 1950s. The paranoia of nuclear
secrets falling into the hands of the Soviet Union led to a radical Act being passed by
the American government, which became an obstacle for international cooperation
with NATO allies in the following decade. The willingness to work around such
restrictions perhaps demonstrates how Anglo-Americans relations were strong, but
only as long as the British were working toward the same goals as the Americans.
The two nations may have a long, shared history but with the constant threat
of nuclear war coming from the communist east. The need to help Britain modernise
their nuclear arsenal was of the utmost importance in evening out, or even pulling
ahead in the Cold War. Overall, Britain’s place in the world hinged on the success of
Operation Grapple. Yet, this was only possible with international cooperation,
specifically American cooperation. Britain’s ability to maintain global influence was
only possible as long as they were working in step with the new, dominant superpower
of the post-war era.
Moreover, the cooperation extended beyond governmental departments to the
British military and scientists themselves. In December 1958, the Ministry of Supply
wrote to the Chairman of the Grapple Task Force querying the possibility of having
British observers in the Nevada desert. 174 This would have been advantageous as the
Grapple series was planned in haste and an input from American scientists may have
offered an insight into the best way to achieve the megaton yield. However, this was a
two-way street as American scientists were keen on observing Grapple Y, which came
to fruition as two were granted permission by the Task Force in 1958. 175 It was most
likely older pieces of legislation, such as the McMahon Act, and secretive customs of
the Cold War which prevented the militaries and scientists from achieving the higher
level of cooperation which they may have desired.
The paranoia and secrecy which hallmarked the Cold War hindered
cooperation and became a hindrance to those on the ground. In a planning meeting on
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the 15th May 1958, Hainworth of the Foreign Office noted that the Americans had been
told of the upcoming experiments but only in “general terms”. 176 Anglo-American
relations were also cordial. The governments had to manoeuvre the customs of the
Cold War to achieve their desired goals and managed to do so without much apparent
friction. However, the friction may have been between the governments and those
administering the experiments. The British military and scientists from both sides of
the pond saw the benefit from cooperating and observing other experiments, as this
may have excelled nuclear weaponry more quickly than the governments had hoped.
Overall, it was American foreign policy that hindered cooperation from taking place.
Anglo-American relations may have been strong as long as they were working toward
the same goal, but the practicalities of achieving were made difficult with the secrecy
that became a staple in the Cold War. Britain’s place in the world may have relied on
their goals being aligned with the Americans but they were equally trying to navigate
the new norms of international diplomacy to maintain their strong position on the
global stage.
Yet, strong Anglo-American relations also benefitted the British in another
sense: it helped provided information about activities in Japan, who were a hindrance
in the initial stages of Operation Grapple. When planning the first round of
experiments, there were large scale protests in Japan, which were supported by the
Japanese government who disapproved of the experiments for a variety of reasons.
The British government wanted information about the protests but was unable to get
hold of it. However, it was much easier for the Americans to get information about the
exact nature of the protests due to their larger sphere of influence and closer
relationship with the Japanese. In a letter dated 25th January 1957, Greenhill, of the
Foreign Office, noted that their intel about the causes of the protests came from the
American Embassy. 177 The British were able to use the newly forged ‘special
relationship’ to their own advantage as they were able to find out the exact nature of
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protests which threatened to delay the experiments or lead to international backlash
against them.
Anglo-American relations could then be summed up as one that relied on
mutual benefits. When working toward the same goal, the two nations were more than
happy to navigate the customs of international relations of the Cold War to achieve
them. Issues such as island sovereignty, economic impact and assistance with
monitoring radioactive fallout became moot as it helped achieve the greater good of a
strong nuclear arsenal. The British government was able to use its American
counterpart to gain information about what could have potentially been a stumbling
block to getting Operation Grapple off the ground. It would be simplistic to suggest
that the British were entirely reliant on the Americans in the late 1950s, as they still
had other means of maintaining influence, as seen with the transformation of the
Empire. Yet, the ‘special relationship’ was an important part of this.
Japan
When discussing how Britain related to other nations in the context of
Operation Grapple, it is important to discuss other Pacific nations, especially Japan as
it was the most vocal in its opposition to the experiments. During the run up to the
tests, there were various large-scale protests across Japan. Despite citing various
reasons for their disapproval, the protests primarily came out of fear. Japan had been
the only power to be devastated by the horrors of nuclear war. By this point, the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were well within living memory for the Japanese.
In a letter to the ambassador to Japan on the 14th February 1957, Selby noted that the
feeling in Tokyo was one of fear as they were “the first known victim of [atomic
weaponry’s] use in practice”. 178 This trauma fuelled the protesters to urge the British
government to avoid further damage at the hands of weapons of mass destruction. This
sentiment was shared by the Japanese government who wrote to the Foreign Office on
the 5th March of the same year stating that “thermonuclear devices should be banned”
as they are part of “a dangerous attempt at a nuclear war and therefore a threat to world
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peace”. 179 The Japanese were desperate to avoid these weapons being used again.
Ultimately, Anglo-Japanese relations were fraught.
From a Japanese perspective, Operation Grapple was threatening to move the
world closer to the brink of nuclear war. Yet, Britain managed to maintain a strong
position in this situation. The Japanese were pleading with the British government. In
this situation the Japanese had little leverage to prevent the British from going ahead
with Operation Grapple beyond appealing to their morality. Britain was in a strong
diplomatic position as they were able to ignore the concerns raised by Japanese
protesters.
The Japanese may have had little leverage but that did not mean that they had
none whatsoever. The Japanese raised various reasons why Operation Grapple should
not go ahead. Perhaps the most enduring was that it would disrupt fishing networks in
the South Pacific. As early as late 1956 the issue of fishing was raised. The complaint
was that radioactive fallout would contaminate the fish as well as disrupting the ships
that had to travel through the region. The Foreign Office had to give assurance that the
exclusion zone would be temporary, and that samples of the fish would be taken to
ensure that contamination was not an issue. 180 It is unclear whether such sampling
came to fruition, but it demonstrates how determined the British were with the megaton
mission. Whereas with the Americans were willing to wave away economic disruption,
the Japanese were using it as leverage against the nuclear experiments. Although the
importance of the fishing trade was later disproven as the Foreign Office found out in
February 1957 that activity in the region was relatively recent. 181 Anglo-Japanese
relations were strained, despite theoretically being on the same side of the Cold War.
Yet, this marked a shift as a combination of environmental and economic
factors which were at the heart of international diplomacy, which gave the relationship
with the Japanese a different edge when compared to the Americans and the French.
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Concerns for the environment, whether genuine or not, gave the Japanese a limited
amount of leverage in dissuading the British from carrying on. Unlike appealing to
morality over weapons of mass destruction, the environmental damage, which would
in turn damage the economy, was harder to ignore. The Foreign Office had to
investigate the particulars of the Japanese fishing industry to wave away this more
enduring argument which further shows how determined the British government was
in achieving their goals. Britain’s status as a ‘great power’ hinged on the successful
development of the hydrogen bomb, meaning they were willing to ignore the concerns
of a country which could not yield the same level of power.
Moreover, the protests bothered those in the British government because they
were seen as personal. After discussing the official reasons given for the protests, the
Japanese ambassador wrote to the Foreign office on the 7th March 1957 about a rally
in Tokyo. He suggested that the rally “proved to be as much anti-British as antibomb”. 182 This may have reflected the exacerbation felt by the ambassador who had
endured weeks of protests against Operation Grapple. He, and the government back in
London, may have been concerned that the protests could have spiralled. If the
experiments got out of hand and spread to other countries, a fierce international
backlash could have prevented both further experiments from taking place and the
support from other countries that they had come to expect by this point. The British
government feared that other nations would have permitted members of the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament sailing into the exclusion zone and delaying time-sensitive
experiments. 183
In the late 1950s, the British were able to ignore the reasons behind the protests
but not the protests themselves. Britain was in a precarious position and still had to
tread carefully. The Japanese protests may have been easier to ignore but the potential
of them expanding beyond the Japanese islands was a cause for concern. The British
government was not in a strong enough position where they could do whatever they
wanted without thought of the consequences. Despite the protests surrounding a
destructive military mission, soft power was key in the British government getting

‘Telegram from the British Embassy, Tokyo, to the Foreign Office, 7th March 1957’, Colonial and
Commonwealth Office: Pacific and Indian Ocean Department: Registered Files (PAC Series), National
Archives, London, CO1036/281, f.69
183
Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb, p.90
182

75

what it wanted. The British did not completely ignore the Japanese but tried to ensure
them that their reasons were out of proportion to the reality of the situation. This
viewpoint also suggests that Anglo-Japanese relations were fragile. To the Foreign
Office, the protests, which the Japanese government supported, were a personal attack.
The experiments were part of national prestige and part of creating a powerful
capitalist bloc, which Japan was supposed to be part of, yet their opposition was a
hindrance to it.
As well as being anti-British, the protests were seen as being communist as
well. On the 13th March 1957, the Foreign Office reported that it had intel that “the
Socialists” in Japan “did not seem to make so much fuss about Russian explosions”. 184
To the Foreign Office, there was a clear hypocrisy coming from what was supposed to
be an ally in the Cold War. The Foreign Office also noted that the protests were
frequently visited by communists and there was “no evidence whatsoever that the
Japanese Government is taking any steps to damp down the situation” when the
communists were involved. 185 The protests were less about non-proliferation but about
the British not advancing their nuclear arsenal. When the large-scale protests had
disappeared, the Tokyo Embassy reported on a meeting where a protest fleet was
discussed in November 1957. The ambassador wrote that descent was “of course
communist inspired”. 186 Although the Foreign Office was more focused on the
advancement of nuclear weaponry, the fear of the communist east was the ultimate
driving force for the British going the nuclear arms race in the first place. Perhaps, the
fragile and strained nature of Anglo-Japanese relations in the late 1950s was based less
on their disapproval of the experiments but how the experiments were perceived. As
the bomb represented power during the Cold War, it was a means of the British
securing their status in the world. The Japanese may have had real concerns over the
implications of Operation Grapple, especially after the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, but this did not matter as opposing the British bomb meant opposing the
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British. As long as the Japanese were protesting, the protests were perceived as
communist, and anti-British in nature. To the Foreign Office, communist ideals had
crept into the Japanese psyche meaning that they could not be fully trusted. Overall,
this may have been why the British government were so quick to disregard the
Japanese protests and the strained relationship it caused.
The causes of the protests may have struck fear into the Foreign Office, but the
implications of the protests were just as serious. The International Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament was a threat as it could have disrupted the experiments in the
immediate term. In a telegram from the Japanese ambassador to the Foreign Office, he
explained that the protestors were in collaboration with the Australian Peace
Council, 187 an organisation whose views were very much in line with the CND. The
CND was keen on disrupting Operation Grapple when Eden announced it, and this was
always in the back of the minds of those organising the experiments. On the 16th
February 1957, the Foreign Office assured the ambassador in Tokyo that there would
be no ships sailing from Yokohama to disrupt the Grapple series. 188 This was a concern
for those working in diplomacy, if the CND sailed from Japan into the exclusion zone
around the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the experiments would have been halted until
further notice when the tests were already being planned in a narrow timeframe. This
possibility was discussed in a telegram from the 5th March 1957 as there were rumours
of a ‘sit down fleet’ sailing southward from Japan. 189 This never came to fruition,
meaning that either the CND did not organise such a voyage or the Japanese helped to
prevent it. There was still a cooperation between the two countries during this period
as the British were trusting that the Japanese government would go beyond sharing the
sentiments of the protestors to allowing them to disrupt Operation Grapple. After all,
the Japanese government may have not approved but they were not necessarily part of
the CND and the British had to trust that they would respect their decision. Overall,
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the British government had to remain mindful of other powers in the Pacific in order
to succeed in their mission there.
Australia and New Zealand
Japan was far from the only Pacific nation to have a connection with Operation
Grapple. Australia and New Zealand were both former colonies who offered support
in different ways. Although the British had a good deal of support from the Australian
government when it came to Operation Grapple, this level of support was not shared
by New Zealand. Initially, the New Zealand government was reluctant to offer any
practical support in the way of resources and soldiers on the ground. When planning
the first round of experiments, the Foreign Office wrote to the Commonwealth
Relations Office in January 1957 about approaching New Zealand about using their
resources to help with the experiments. However, they were unsure whether there was
much interest from New Zealand aviators in travelling to the region. 190 Later on, the
British government was reluctant to approach the New Zealand government about
positioning monitoring equipment on their islands. On the 30th September 1957, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies explained to the Fijian governor that secrecy
surrounding the experiments was to remain until very late in the day and that it would
be “undesirable” to approach the New Zealand personnel about a monitoring station.191
Although, the Secretary of State for the Colonies noted on the 10th October that it was
“decided after all to ask New Zealand personnel […] to operate this equipment”. 192
Despite eventual cooperation there was a hesitation from the Secretary of State. He
may have been tentative as the New Zealand authorities were perceived as
unsupportive. When compared to Australia, New Zealand did not have as close as bond
with Britain, particularly after the Second World War when an identity separate from
‘Britishness’ was being formed. 193 Both Australia and New Zealand were part of the
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ANZUS, a treaty with the United States which protected military interests in the
Pacific and shifted the strategic focus of the two nations toward America. 194 Overall,
Britain’s relationship with New Zealand was a cautious one, they may have had close
ties in the past but Britain had to tread more carefully when approaching their former
colony to win them over again.
However, the New Zealand government were not entirely closed to offering
support for the development of the British nuclear arsenal. Other than offering to man
the monitoring station, they regularly sent resources to the islands, 195 signifying that
Operation Grapple had their seal of approval. However, this support was not
guaranteed to continue. On the 2nd August 1957, the U.K. High Commissioner in New
Zealand wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office about the support offered and
that it was unclear whether this would continue as New Zealand was due for an election
toward the end of that year. 196 The New Zealand election would have been a cause of
concern for the British government as nuclear weaponry was a more contentious issue
and the other political parties may have not have supported the experiments at
Christmas Island in the same way, if at all. 197
The foundation for the relationship between Britain and New Zealand in the
late 1950s was unstable. For Britain, New Zealand was a preferred ally in the megaton
mission as it was geographically close to the Gilberts as well as it being a former
colony which became one of the original members of the Commonwealth. Yet, the
support that Britain desired depended on political divisions within New Zealand.
Britain had not been in a position to make demands of the Dominions for decades and
had to rely on shrewd diplomacy to get what it wanted. This was symptomatic of the
transformation from a formal empire to the Commonwealth. Britain was the head of
this new structure but were far from an absolute power. The Commonwealth was
perhaps one of a more equal footing as some New Zealand political parties were able
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to object and withdraw support for one of the main goals of British foreign policy if
they got into power. Britain may still have been a powerful figurehead of a different
structure in the late 1950s, but power was much softer than it was a century earlier.
When dealing with Australia, the British government used a different tack.
Gaining Australian support was a much easier experience as the Australian
government were one of the most supportive of Operation Grapple in the planning
stages. The British nuclear experiments initially started off in Maralinga, in South
Australia, in the first half of the 1950s. Maralinga became a less viable option due to
the growing opposition from the CND and the Australian public turning against the
idea of weapons of mass destruction being detonated in their country. 198 When it came
to Operation Grapple, in an effort to persuade the Australian government to continue
their support, the planning committee of the Christmas Island series suggested that it
would be better to view them as a continuation of the Maralinga trials. 199 AngloAustralian relations were arguably much stronger as the Australian government were
willing to continue to support their former colonial leaders in an effort to secure
Oceania in the event of the Cold War heating up. Like New Zealand, Australian
interests were focused more on the Pacific and there was an identity that was much
less British being forged. 200 Yet, despite the CND contributing to the move to
Christmas Island, the Australian government was firmer on its support for the capitalist
west in the Cold War. The security of the Pacific depended on the success of the
missions such as Operation Grapple as helped put Oceania firmly on the side of the
west as it was the ‘nuclear playground’ of the main capitalist powers. This provides a
reasonable explanation for Australian support, and the organisers of the Grapple series
may have been aware of this and were able to use it to ensure ongoing Australian
support. Britain was still a strong power when examining Anglo-Australian relations
as they were able to convince them of the experiments’ necessity. Yet, power relied
on much softer means such as shrewd negotiation rather than simply demanding
support. Despite power being militarised, it was ultimately soft. Like with dealing with
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the New Zealand government, British power was based more on negotiation and
persuasion, albeit on different terms.
However, the relationship with Australia was soon weakened. Whilst the
experiments were underway, there was an issue with the security system used to send
the messages, meaning that they temporarily became compromised. This led to a shortterm termination of communication to other countries, including Australia. On the 9th
September 1957, a memo from the Ministry of Defence was circulated discussing this
issue. They said that “there were difficulties in communications, which were the
responsibility of the Air Ministry in collaboration with the Royal Australian Air Force”
which led to correspondence being compromised and delayed until the issue was
sorted. 201 Britain may have held Australia in high esteem as they were both a key part
of the Commonwealth as well as one of the biggest supporters of Operation Grapple.
Yet, when security was breached, there was little hesitation in stopping the
communication with them. The Australian government was useful in their support and
supply of resources, but the focus of the British government was the development of a
functioning hydrogen bomb. The Ministry of Defence was quick to cut ties with a close
ally to preserve their nuclear secret. It was the megaton mission that came first and
keeping the former colony out of the loop was perhaps collateral damage. Overall,
Britain’s place in the world became more inward focused. The nuclear bomb was the
key to maintain their position on the global stage and international cooperation, limited
as it was, was an important part of achieving this. Yet, because of the McMahon Act,
the British government saw this endeavour as something to be achieved by themselves.
To an extent, Australia could have been part of the same system, but not entirely. The
British government was quick to temporarily drop the Dominion when needed. The
British world system had shifted. The Dominions were part of it, but the distance from
the metropole persisted.
However, the Dominions were still the preferred international partners. On the
8th May 1958, the Ministry of Supply discussed changes to security clearances
regarding the information about the results of the experiments. It was decided that
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anything that was not the top level of secrecy of “U.K. eyes only” could be shared with
the Dominions. 202 The British military was mindful of their allies when the Grapple
series was coming to a close. The relationship was very strong as they were willing to
share some closely guarded secrets with them. Toward the end of the experiments, the
Ministry of Supply became more open to the idea of visitors coming to Christmas
Island to learn some of the surface details of the experiments as well as admiring the
success of the Grapple series. In August 1959, requests were made for visitors to come
to the islands. There was hesitation from the Military of Supply, but it was more than
willing for passengers in “possession of British or Dominion passports” to come and
visit. 203 Various groups were suggested but it was preferred that the first lot of visitors
come from the Dominions. The experiments ran parallel to decolonisation and the
formation the Commonwealth. Inviting Dominion visitors was perhaps a gesture to
Australia and New Zealand that they were close allies to the British and that they were
able to be involved in what had become a top priority in foreign policy. Britain’s
relationship with the two nations was ultimately cordial. The experiments helped
Britain reach two goals: a strong commonwealth going forward and project the image
of scientific and military parity as the world entered the 1960s. Britain was arguably
in a strong position in 1959 as Grapple Z was an undoubted success. Yet, the nature of
power was both militarised and soft. Throughout the process, both the Foreign and
Colonial Offices, and the Ministry of Supply had to negotiate with Australia and New
Zealand to ensure their support, which they may well have needed in other areas as the
20th century progressed. After the experiments ended, soft power was exerted through
offering tokens of appreciation through an invitation to the islands, which was most
likely part of the scheme to ensure support from the Dominions in the long-term.
Fiji
Yet, the Dominions were far from the only colonies, former or current, in the
Pacific. As discussed in the previous chapter, there was an array of small colonies of
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various statuses. The most notable was Fiji, who were the other Crown Colony in the
region, beside the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and comprised a large amount of lowerranking military personnel during Operation Grapple. Much more than with Australia
and New Zealand, Britain still maintained the upper hand in their relationship with Fiji.
This power extended beyond the central government to the Ministry of Supply, who
were in regular contact with the Fijian government. The Ministry of Supply wanted to
control the exchange of information about the experiments and wanted to set the rules
of what could be printed in the Fijian press. 204 The British military was acting beyond
what would have been expected from them. British colonial power was becoming
increasingly reliant on the military in the post-war era (see Chapter II) which led to the
military being legitimised in controlling the information published in the Fijian Press.
This caused friction with the Fijian governor, who did not enjoy his experience
working with the Ministry of Supply. In the minutes from a meeting on the 19th January
1959, it was noted that the Fijian governor had raised an issue over the payment of the
soldiers. The planning committee noted that this was simply because the governor had
not asked the Ministry of Supply, implying that the Fijian governor was not
accustomed to working with the military over expense claims. Anglo-Fijian relations
still had a clear hierarchy in the late 1950s. With the transition toward a military-based
structure in the Pacific, the British government were willing to transfer power to the
Ministry of Supply, which caused both an expansion of Military powers and the
confusion of the Fijian governor. To keep the governor on side in the long-term, a
different tack was needed to prevent him from becoming uncooperative.
One of these means was an alteration to the economies to ensure that they were
more closely linked. The Ministry of Supply were in control of signing off on expenses
claimed by the Fijian soldiers. 205 On the 2nd September 1959, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies clarified to the Fijian governor that the Ministry of Supply were in
charge of all funds regarding Operation Grapple, with the Crown Agents acting as
intermediary figures. 206 The experiments at Christmas Island were a good opportunity
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for young Fijian men as they were struggling with unemployment before being
recruited. 207 The offer of work from the metropole appealed to them, and by extension
the Fijian governor as it was a way of bringing in money to the colony.
Yet, this worked in favour of the British government for various reasons. In the
short term it helped supply an adequate work force for the experiments but in the long
term, it helped keep Fijian reliant on Britain. The wages of hundreds of young men
were coming from the metropole, and the Fijian governor was receiving expenses from
the Ministry of Supply. Closely tying the economies in this way may have been a way
of ensuring Fijian support in the megaton mission as there was a financial incentive.
This may have ensured Fijian support and cooperation in the later activities in the
South Pacific, which may have extended beyond nuclear testing as they were
dependent on Britain. It may have also been to ensure Fiji were in a subordinate role
for the foreseeable future as part of the Commonwealth, with the UK at the helm
calling the shots. Britain did not have to negotiate with the Fijians in the same way as
the Australians or the New Zealanders, and they were able to use different tactics to
preserve old imperial power structures. Fiji was in a different position to the Pacific
Dominions as it was not yet independent and may have been still looking to Britain for
support, which the British were able to use to their own ends and ensure Fijian
subordination.
Although, the British government was far from dictatorial when dealing with
the Fijian governor. Their relationship was not as simple as merely colonial master and
subject. The British still had to incentivise the Fijian governor as his support was not
entirely unconditional. On the 5th September 1958, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies wrote to the Fijian governor noting the economic benefits that partaking in
Operation Grapple would have. He wrote that a once the experiments were over, the
British government would supply the pensions for the veterans. If the veterans were to
die before the money ran out, then the remainder could be used for anything the Fijian
governor decided. 208 The British did not rule Fiji with an iron fist, the government had
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to use a softer approach to ensure support in their nuclear endeavour. Much like with
Australia and New Zealand, the British had to use softer means of rule rather than
making demands of their smaller colonies. However, there is still an element of
coercion. The incentive the Secretary of State for the Colonies used was an economic
one. The British government ensured that there were close economic ties that worked
in favour of the Fijians as well to make sure that they agreed to send resources.
Using economics as leverage in diplomacy was by no means new or even
unique to British diplomacy but it was a key part in dealing with the Fijian governor.
As seen with dealing with other nations, British power was quite soft and subtle. There
is little doubt that they were still a strong force when it came to international relations,
but to achieve their goal of a functioning hydrogen bomb, incentivisation and coercion
were more powerful tools in ensuring cooperation than brute force. This is part of how
the British were able to transform the Empire into the Commonwealth: through the use
of soft power rather than making demands.
However, the Fijian governor was able to use the situation to his own ends.
The British government were desperate for Operation Grapple to be a success, as their
position in the Cold War, and geopolitical status, by extension, depended on it. The
Fijian governor may not have wanted to remain subservient to the British government,
and the military in the 1950s and beyond. He wanted greater autonomy for the Fijian
military that were going. In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he
suggested that the finer details of the logistics of using the Fijian troops “should be
worked out between the Commander of the Fijian Military Force and the Senior
Officer of the Grapple area”. 209 He did not want the Fijian soldiers to go to Christmas
Island to merely be subservient but have a sense of equality with the commanding
officers having to cooperate with their Fijian counterparts. The Fijian governor may
have been aware of the colony’s subordinate status, but also aware of the position
Britain was in at the time. He used this as leverage to get the Fijian military better
autonomy. However, the Grapple Task Force were keen on keeping the Fijian soldiers
in their place. The Task Force noted that there was a “difference in powers and
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responsibilities” for the roles available at Christmas Island. 210 The Fijian soldiers were
not needed to run the experiments but provide manpower. It is unclear what the
relationship between the higher-ranking Fijian officers and the Task Force on the
islands was like, and the extent that they were consulted but from the Task Force’s
point of view there was still a clear hierarchy in the Anglo-Fijian relationship. Overall,
the British military still saw the Fijians as subservient, which may reflect how the
central government saw them, but the geopolitical position Britain was in meant that
the Fijian governor was able try and use this to his advantage. British power may have
been militarised, but it was exerted through subtle means.
Although the Fijian governor may have tried to use Operation Grapple to the
advantage of the Fijian military, he still supported the experiments in the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands. In a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the 21st April
1958, he wrote that he was trying to recruit “experienced staff”, but they were being
“attracted away to other employment” with better pay. 211 Ultimately, Anglo-Fijian
relations were cordial. Though, the Fijian governor may have been aware that the
future of the islands depended on the strength of Britain. Without a strong Britain on
the geopolitical stage, Fiji may have been vulnerable to communist, or American,
expansion into the southern Pacific. Fiji may have been strategic for the British when
conducting nuclear experiments, but a strong Britain was also useful to Fiji in the
grander scheme of the Cold War. The relationship between Britain and the remote
colony was cordial because it was symbiotic which had the potential to be useful both
in the late 1950s and the remainder of the 20th century. Perhaps this is the best way to
characterise Britain’s place in the world at the height of the Cold War. It was a position
where diplomacy was most effective when the nation being dealt with were useful in
the megaton mission. Fiji, like Australia and New Zealand, was useful in supplying
resources. The French and Americans were useful in manning stations on their remote
islands, and information which could advance the nuclear arsenal. Whereas, Japan was
of less use, which led to a frostier approach toward the Tokyo government. Japan was
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not necessarily useful in succeeding in the megaton mission beyond preventing the
CND from disrupting it, which meant it could easily be ignored. Overall, British power
may have been rather soft, but it was mainly wielded to achieve the larger goal of a
functioning hydrogen bomb.
Conclusion
With the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the potential for warfare
changed forever. Possessing such powerful weapons was key to elevating geopolitical
status. Britain was keen to developing its own functioning nuclear bombs, and by the
late 1950s this had developed into a hydrogen bomb in the megaton range. Whilst
Operation Grapple was going on, it is difficult to gauge what Britain’s place in the
world is without comparing it to other nations, and how it interacted with them. After
all Britain did not exist in a vacuum and because of this, Britain needed the aid of other
nations, to provide manpower, resources, and the use of territories to measure
radioactive fallout. When negotiating for these things, Britain was able to maintain the
upper hand, and were generally successful in getting what they wanted. Britain was
still able to maintain a strong geopolitical position yet, was vulnerable as it was reliant
on the resources of others and were not necessarily capable of doing so by themselves.
The British government, and military, were able to maintain a strong position
in diplomacy primarily because of their ability to persuade and offer other nations what
they wanted. The French and Americans were offered a glimpse into the experiments.
Although, they were hindered by the atmosphere of secrecy with had become
customary during the Cold War. The British government had to work around this but
were perhaps more willing with the Americans as they were much further ahead in the
nuclear arms race. Whereas the secrecy hindered the scientists who wanted to work
with their French counterparts on the measuring stations. When it came to Australia,
New Zealand and Fiji, the intention was rather different for keeping them onside. The
three Pacific nations were useful in providing the most resources, but they were also
integral in the formation of the Commonwealth. Britain offered them limited intel on
the experiments, as well as a chance to visit the islands to see the blasts first-hand.
Economic incentives were also put in place for the Fijian governor. British power was
soft when dealing with colonies, both former and current. They were not acting in a
way that was harsh and dictatorial but one where there was an element of give and
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take, which was an unusual approach to dealing with small, remote colonies, such as
Fiji. Overall, France, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji had varying
amounts of usefulness to the British government when perusing the megaton mission.
British power became both increasingly militarised and softer during this period.
Yet, there was also frequent correspondence with the Japanese government and
ambassador stationed there. Japan raised various concerns but were of little concern to
the British. The ability to wave away these concerns further demonstrates how strong
a position the British government were in as they could pay little attention to the pleas
of the Japanese government over the potential effects of nuclear warfare. Through
Britain may have been strong it was still vulnerable. The British government had to
tread carefully as the Japanese protests could have spread elsewhere in the world, and
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament could have launched ships to the exclusion
zone which would have disrupted the experiments. Therefore, Britain was in a rather
precarious position when planning Operation Grapple. They may have been in a
powerful position, but this did not negate how vulnerable this was meaning that the
power wielded was rather soft. Soft power was perhaps the most effective way of
succeeding in developing methods of mass destruction.
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Although short-lived, Operation Grapple had a profound impact on the Gilbert
and Ellice Islands. The nuclear experiments marked a shift in British Imperialism and,
by extension, geopolitical power in the 1950s. Most notably, British power became
more reliant on the military. The Ministry of Supply took over many of the
responsibilities which had traditionally belonged to the Foreign Office, Colonial
Office, and the governors that resided in the colonies. This included many of the
administrative duties, which caused tension during the transition toward the military
being in charge. The arrival of a starkly increased military presence transformed the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands from a colonial backwater to a military base at the heart of
Britain’s top priority in terms of foreign policy. This change appeared to be permanent
with the plans for further experiments in the 1960s, as well as permanent infrastructure
being put in place to accommodate this. Moreover, the Ministry of Supply were also
in charge of the flow of information about Britain’s closely guarded nuclear secrets,
including the press, foreign governments, and foreign scientists. The British state was
becoming increasingly reliant on the military in general, 212 as seen with the exchange
of information, but Operation Grapple was a platform for this being extended to the
furthest colonies. The discourse between scientists further demonstrates the
dominating power of the military as they were not only in charge of information leaked
to the press but also how individuals could talk about the experiments. Britain was not
only a ‘warfare state’ but also part of a militarised world system as well. The military
was also an integral part of international relations during the Cold War. The newer
form of militarised power was realised through softer means of shrewd diplomacy and
negotiation. Operation Grapple relied on cooperation from other nations, such as the
United States, Australia and Fiji, the handling of this side of things would have
traditionally been the role of the Foreign Office. The nuclear experiments helped
transform British geopolitical power into a system that was reliant on the military to
succeed.
However, it was not only the calibration toward the military that Operation
Grapple changed, but it also centred the Pacific islands within the larger structures of
Empire. Although the nuclear experiments at Christmas Island wound up lasting only
five years, it marked a shift in the mindset regarding the smaller colonies in the South
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Pacific. For as long as they were formally colonised, they were regarded as a colonial
backwater that provided a modest income but were of little strategic importance in the
British world system. 213 However, Operation Grapple recentred colonial interests
toward the Pacific, as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands became one of the most important
colonies in the Empire as they became useful as a centre for developing a nuclear
arsenal.
Power was in constant flux during the 20th century and was continuously being
renegotiated. This renegotiation extended from Britain to the most remote colonies.
Part of this was refocusing attention toward the Pacific. After all, the Grapple series
ran parallel to independence movements in Africa and the ‘East of Suez’ movement.
The British government was aware that the world system it relied on prior to the
Second World War needed to evolve or it would crumble. The Commonwealth was
still a new concept, with the structure and Britain’s role in it still being established, so
a mixed system with some of the colonies as part of it may have been appealing.
Therefore, Operation Grapple helped re-establish the British Empire in the Pacific by
giving it a new purpose. Taking the Pacific nuclear experiments into account also
highlights the limits of the ‘East of Suez’ movement. Since the Suez Crisis, British
interests eastward of the Suez Canal was limited beyond withdrawal. Yet, Operation
Grapple shows that this was not necessarily the case. The British government had a
responsibility to its smallest colonies and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands were not seen
as being a viable option for independence in the 1950s. Operation Grapple gave them
a new purpose and sustained Britain’s presence in the South Pacific. With the islands
becoming much more useful, the British government had little incentive and thus did
not envision withdrawal and decolonisation in the short-term.
The islands may have been useful in terms of foreign policy, but they were a
tool in Britain re-gaining geo-political legitimacy in the Cold War era. The nuclear
bomb, rather than only being in control of a vast Empire, soon came to represent power.
The mass destruction that managed to end the Second World War meant that if another
large-scale war broke out again, it would have been better to be the one launching the
missiles than receiving them. Operation Grapple was a success. Britain had managed
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to gain possession of a fully functioning, and controllable, hydrogen bomb by 1959.
The outdated atomic bombs of the early 1950s were now a thing of the past, and Britain
also succeeded in not falling behind in nuclear arms race. The link between the Grapple
series and British geopolitical status is obvious in this respect, as it helped sustain it.
However, the experiments also managed to sustain the Empire in the South Pacific,
albeit briefly. Once the functioning bomb was completed, the Grapple task force were
looking to the future. They envisioned a future where the Pacific would be the centre
of British scientific operations to build on the Grapple series. This meant that the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands, as well as other colonies in the region such as Fiji, were
kept firmly under British control, meaning that the Empire was sustained. Although
this did not last due to the Grapple series being short-lived. Overall, Operation Grapple
may have not lasted for very long, but it represents the changing nature of British
imperialism and geopolitical power. The British government were not keen on losing
their long-established empire and recalibrated their attention toward a militarised
system based in the Pacific where their part of the nuclear playground could give them
a new sense of legitimacy.
It was quite vague as to when the Grapple task force and metropolitan
government foresaw the experiments beyond the Grapple series, but they did not come
to fruition partly due to the growing influence of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
in Britain. Initially, the next round of tests was postponed until Britain signed the TestBan Treaty in 1963. The Test Ban Treaty was initiated by President Kennedy in
response to the Cuban Missile Crisis at the end of the previous year, and essentially
nulled the McMahon Act by banning the detonation of nuclear bombs but international
cooperation could take place. 214 The British forces merged with the Americans again
in the 1960s, making the need for their own nuclear weapons programme redundant
and the forces never returned to Christmas Island for further experiments.
The Test Ban Treaty also had a knock-on effect in terms of European Rule in
the South Pacific. The 1960s saw political activism centred around ridding the Pacific
of nuclear weapons altogether. This was primarily spearheaded by Fiji, but the
sentiment soon turned into Pan-Pacific conferences discussing the nature of rule from
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foreign powers. Many soon came to the conclusion that the only way to ensure that the
Pacific was no longer used as a nuclear playground was to push for independence. The
1970s saw many new nations being recognised by the United Nations after years of
decolonisation negotiations. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands were separated in two, with
the Gilbert Islands becoming the Republic of Kiribati in 1979 and the Ellice Islands
the Republic of Tuvalu in 1978. 215 Upon their independence, Kiribati signed the Treaty
of Tarawa in 1979 with the United States which ensures military defence in exchange
for the United States maintaining military bases on various islands, which is still in
effect. 216 Since its foundation, Tuvalu has never formed a military and instead has a
similar agreement with New Zealand. 217 The two nations may be free from nuclear
weapons, but their defence arrangements are still reliant on other nations. Therefore,
it is difficult to understand the decolonisation and independence of these republics
without considering the impacts of Operation Grapple, which will remain an integral
part of their histories.
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